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Summary 
Socio-economic rights have been described as the “underdeveloped 
stepchild of the human rights family”. There has been a tendency to treat 
them as merely aspirational and it is frequently argued that they may not 
deserve the name of rights as they lack content and are considered ill-suited 
for enforcement. Owing to this, and because of the fact that their enjoyment 
has by their very nature, been considered as more resource-demanding than 
enjoyment of civil and political rights and hence involving sensitive 
questions of political resource allocation, they have been considered to not 
belong in constitutions in other forms than aspirational goals and especially 
not in any justiciable bill of rights documents.  
Consequently, issues related to enjoyment of socio-economic rights have 
been considered to be the prerogative of the executive and legislative 
branches of government as courts do not posses the same democratic 
legitimacy in regard to the allocation of resources.  
 
Therefore, given the above context, it is remarkable that post-Apartheid 
South Africa opted for inclusion of socio-economic rights alongside civil 
and political rights in its first democratic constitution of 1996. Moreover, 
subsequently, its Constitutional Court has not shied away from adjudicating 
on cases pertaining socio-economic rights. Some of the Court’s decisions 
have been described as the most far-reaching decisions concerning socio-
economic rights.  
 
This thesis analysis the Court’s jurisprudence against the backdrop of the 
debate and controversies related to the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights. It shows that the Court has demonstrated that such rights are in fact 
justiciable, but that their adjudication, in general, is more politically 
sensitive and to some extent more complicated than adjudication of civil and 
political rights and that the Court therefore inevitable has had to treat such 
rights differently from civil and political rights. This has especially had 
bearing on remedies, and the Constitutional Court has not, despite giving 
general effect to the rights in question, been in a position to offer relief to 
the individual. This would support the stance that socio-economic rights are 
different to their nature and enjoyment when compared with civil and 
political rights. 
Sammanfattning 
Det har funnits en tendens att behandla sociala och ekonomiska rättigheter 
som enbart aspiratoriska. Många har därför hävdat att sådana rättigheter inte 
är riktiga rättigheter, eftersom deras innehåll är alltför vaga för att vara 
utkrävbara. Dessutom är deras åtnjutande för individen ofta beroende av att 
det finns tillräckliga ekonomiska och materiella resurser, vilkas 
fördelning/omfördelning bör vara föremål för politiska beslut. Av dessa 
anledningar har det ofta hävdats att sociala och ekonomiska rättigheter inte 
hör hemma i konstitutioner i annan form än aspiratoriska mål. Ekonomiska 
och sociala rättigheter har huvudsakligen betraktats som tillhörandes de 
verkställande och lagstiftande organens ansvarsområden. På grund av deras 
politiska prägel har ekonomiska och sociala rättigheter ansetts vara ett 
område som domstolarna så långt som möjligt bör hålla sig ifrån, eftersom 
domstolar inte har samma demokratiska legitimitet som den verkställande 
och lagstiftande makten.    
 
Mot denna bakgrund är det anmärkningsvärt att Sydafrika efter Apartheid-
regimens fall valt att inkludera utkrävbara ekonomiska och sociala 
rättigheter i sin första demokratiska konstitution. Dessutom har den 
konstitutionella domstolen i Sydafrika inte tvekat att besluta i mål om 
sociala och ekonomiska rättigheter som grundar sig på sådana rättigheter i 
konstitutionen.   
 
Denna uppsats analyserar, mot bakgrund av den generella debatten som 
funnits angående sociala och ekonomiska rättigheter, den sydafrikanska 
konstitutionella domstolens praxis rörande utkrävbarheten av sociala och 
ekonomiska rättigheter som har sin grund i den sydafrikanska 
konstitutionen. Uppsatsen visar att den sydafrikanska konstitutionella 
domstolen i sina beslut visat att sociala och ekonomiska rättigheter är 
utkrävbara, men att sådana rättigheters skiljer sig från civila och politiska 
rättigheter, eftersom domstolarna ovillkorligen i högre grad får ta hänsyn till 
att deras beslut inte ska betraktas som politiska.  
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Abbreviations 
ANC African National Congress 
CERD Convention ion the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
ESC Economic, social and cultural (rights) 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
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1 Introduction 
Economic and social rights have been recognised at the international level 
since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). On 16 
December 1966 the United Nations (UN) adopted the first global treaty that 
established states’ legal obligations to protect a number of economic, social 
and cultural rights, i.e. the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Almost three decades later, during the 1993 
World Conference on Human Rights, it was concluded that all Human 
Rights are universal, interdependent, interrelated and indivisible. Still, there 
remains much ambivalence and much debate, both internationally and 
nationally in regard to the character and concept of socio-economic rights.1 
 
One scholar has expressed it as “even brief acquaintance with the academic 
literature is enough to indicate that there is a deep and enduring 
disagreement over the proper status of economic, social and cultural 
rights”.2 Moreover, outside the academic sphere, many governments have 
had an ambivalent relation to them, both domestically and in international 
fora.3  
 
Especially, domestically in many countries, there have been constitutional 
debates on the justiciability of socio-economic rights as the issue of 
inclusion of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights in constitutions 
has generally been considered controversial as many people have considered 
such rights as inherently non-justiciable and not suited for judicial 
enforcement. It has been argued that in most legal documents these rights 
are vaguely worded and not sufficiently defined, or in other words, that they 
lack determinate content. Therefore they have been perceived as merely 
aspirational and ill-suited for domestic application and not belonging in 
democratic constitutions.4   
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that socio-economic rights are inherently 
resource demanding and that their fulfilment depend on the availability of 
public resources which by their very nature are always limited and that 
many states do not possess. Decisions on the use of such limited resources 
and related prioritizations and allocations are by many seen as the 
prerogative of the executive and legislature. Consequently, the 
constitutionalisation of such rights would result in an undesired transfer of 
political power from these two branches of government to the judiciary, 
which does not enjoy the same democratic legitimacy to make decisions on 
issues relating to the allocation of social and economic resources.  
 
                                                 
1 Sunstein, C. R., p. 4. 
2 H. Steiner and P. Alston, p. 256. 
3 Ibid,.  p. 249.  
4 Pieterse, M. (2004) p. 884. 
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The above concerns and disagreement have historically negatively 
influenced the implementation of socio-economic rights both internationally 
and within nation states. As a result, in the area of human rights, generally 
speaking, the advances made have traditionally been in the area of civil and 
political rights.  
 
From a constitutional law perspective, the issue highlights one of the 
paradoxes of modern constitutional theory, as, on the one hand, in general, 
in modern democracies, enforcement of human rights by an independent and 
unelected judiciary is considered essential.5 While, on the other hand, such 
judicial enforcement also has the potential to undermine representative 
political processes.  
 
The discursive devaluation of socio-economic rights and the ineffective 
enforcement of these rights has prompted some commentators to describe 
socio-economic rights as the “normatively underdeveloped stepchild” of the 
human rights family.6 However,  and perhaps somehow paradoxically, 
African states have in the 1990s succeeded in giving more attention and 
renewed status to socio-economic rights by putting focus on poverty and 
their right to development coupled with highlighting the integral role socio-
economic rights play for the enjoyment of equality and democracy.7  
 
South Africa is a country previously infamous for its persistent violation, 
through its Apartheid policy, of the civil and political rights of its majority 
black people accompanied by a related dispossession of socio-economic 
rights.  
 
However, today, post-Apartheid South Africa is considered to have taken 
one of the most radical initiatives with regard to protection of socio-
economic rights by including them alongside civil and political right in its 
first new democratic Constitution of 1996. The Constitution is widely seen  
as one of the most sophisticated and comprehensive systems of 
constitutional protection of socio-economic rights in the world and its 
Constitutional Court has made some of the most far-reaching decisions 
concerning these rights. Owing to this, the South African experience is very 
useful for any lawyer interested in analysing the character and justiciability 
of socio-economic rights. 
1.1 Purpose 
The inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the Constitution and 
the willingness of its Constitutional Court to adjudicate socio-economic 
rights have been described the main distinctive elements of the South 
African Constitutional system and a number of cases before the Court have 
shaped the scope of actual protection of socio-economic rights in the 
country. Its jurisprudence has attracted much interest outside South Africa 
                                                 
5 Klare, K. E., p. 148.  
6 Bilchitz, D., p. 1.  
7 Yigen, K., p. 13.  
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and in particular in relation to the discussion on the constitutionalisation and 
justiciability of socio-economic rights.8 
 
South Africa is therefore a very interesting case study when discussing and 
analysing the character of socio-economic rights and the challenges related 
to their justiciability and constitutionalisation. There are also close textual 
similarities between the socio-economic rights enumerated in the South 
African Constitution and the ICESCR (which is ironic as the country has not 
ratified the ICESCR), which make the case of South Africa even more 
interesting for a lawyer interested in international constitutional law.  
 
The subject matter is such that before being able to embark on an analysis of 
the South African example, it is important to gain deeper knowledge about 
the history of such rights, the legal and political controversies surrounding 
them and how they are protected on the international level.   
 
Hence, the intention of this thesis is three-fold. 
 
Firstly, it will provide the reader with a general introduction to the 
traditional discourse on the categorisation of human rights and the nature of 
socio-economic rights. This includes an exposition of the theoretical 
discourse on the controversy and challenges associated with the 
justiciability and constitutionalisation of such rights, i.e. mainly issues 
related to separation of powers and institutional legitimacy, resource 
allocation/polycentric issues and the content and character of socio-
economic rights. Moreover, it will briefly describe how such rights are 
protected on the international level.  
 
Secondly, it will look at the empirical case of South Africa, which is a 
country where socio-economic rights are included in the constitution and 
where such rights have been made judicially enforceable, and in particular 
discuss and analyse how the South African Constitutional Court has dealt 
with the various challenges discussed in the introductory part and its 
suggested role as a protector of socio-economic rights. 
 
Lastly, based on the empirical study of the South African jurisprudence, a 
more general analysis will be conducted focusing on providing some more 
general conclusions regarding the character, justiciability and 
constitutionalisation of socio-economic rights based on the South African 
jurisprudence. 
1.2 Method and material 
While the South African Constitutional Court has dealt with the socio-
economic rights provisions of the Constitution in a number of instances, it is 
widely regarded that the core of its substantive jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights is manifested in four fundamental cases, namely, 
                                                 
8 Christiansen, E., p.1.  
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Soobramoney v Minister of Health (1998),  Government of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others (2001), Minister of Health and Others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others (2002) and Khosa v Minister of 
Social Development 2004.9 
 
In order to analyse the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights of the South 
African Constitutional Court, I will analyse the four cases mentioned above. 
In order to gain deeper understanding of the general subject matter, I have 
also studied the works of prominent academics and practitioners in the fields 
of international human rights law and constitutional law.  
 
In order to understand the South African context, I have in particular studied 
the legal works of South African academics and lawyers. Among these, 
works of scholars like Justice Pillay, Marius Pieterse, David Bilchitz and 
Justice Albie Sachs, have been a good point of departure for such a journey.  
 
In the text the notions “economic and social rights” and “socio-economic 
rights” are used interchangeably, meaning that they, in substance, have the 
same meaning. 
                                                 
9 Christiansen, E. p. 5, Bilchitz, D. p. 5-15 and Sachs, A. p. 8.  
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2 Different categories of rights 
2.1 The traditional distinction between 
civil and political rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights 
Traditionally it has been common to offer a twofold classification of human 
rights into two main categories, i.e., on the one hand, classical civil and 
political rights such as freedom of speech and liberty of the person and, on 
the other hand, economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to work 
and to housing.  
 
The above categorization has also often been referred to as “negative” and 
“positive rights” where the former are rights held only against the state 
which, in this respect, is restrained from certain actions against all 
individuals, while the latter requires the state to take positive action by 
awarding some form of benefit or delivering some service to the individual. 
Such positive rights may also apply against other individuals as well as 
against the government. 
 
A typical example of a negative right is the right to not be subjected to 
torture. The right to free and equal access to education for all is a typical 
positive right.  
 
The reasons behind the separation between the two sets of rights have been 
debated. Some commentators explain the separation as mainly emanating 
from differences in the political ideologies of the two blocks during the 
Cold War (see 2.2). Others, however, stress the fact that civil and political 
rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic rights, on the other hand, differ 
from each other in terms of judicial enforceability and state obligations.10 
The latter view implies that socio-economic rights are not “feasible through 
the concept of rights in the same way as civil and political rights.11 These 
views will be explained in more detail in chapter 4.  
 
It has also been common to divide human rights into three “generations” or 
dimensions. Here, civil and political rights refer to the first generation while 
the second generation comprises economic, social and cultural rights. The 
importance of the former was championed mainly by the Western countries 
while the latter had its proponents among the former socialist states. 
Southern states, or developing nations, on their part, put the human rights 
discourse in the context of colonialism and imperialism and they stressed 
the importance of a third generation of rights such as the right to self-
                                                 
10 Yigen, K., p. 14-15. 
11 Ibid., p. 15. 
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determination and the right to development. This historical backdrop will be 
explained below. 
2.2 History of socio-economic rights 
The historical origins of socio-economic rights are difficult to trace although 
many different religious traditions express that people in need and who 
cannot look after themselves should be cared for.12 Similar considerations 
can also be identified in the philosophical analyses and political theories of 
scholars as diverse as Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx and John Rawls and, inter 
alia, the political programmes of late nineteenth century socialists in 
Britain, social insurance schemes introduced by Chancellor Bismarck in 
Germany and the first Soviet Constitution.13 
 
From an international human rights law perspective, an appropriate point of 
departure can be traced to the establishment of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in 1919. Which according to the Treaty of Versailles of 
1919, should work for the abolishment of “injustice, hardship and privation 
of workers”. The establishment of the ILO was the response of Western 
countries to the challenges of the Russian Revolution and its Bolshevism 
and Social ideology that also gained followers in many countries outside 
Russia who primarily demanded more humane conditions of labour.14  
 
In the inter-war years the great depression of the early 1930s brought about 
an awareness that there is a need to protect those who are unemployed, and 
economic scholars such as Milton Keynes advocated for full employment 
policies.15 Owing to this and other developments, during the drafting of the 
UN Charter, the multilateral treaty that really started the internationalisation 
of human rights, various initiatives were taken on the international level to 
include provisions on “full employment” as a commitment to be undertaken 
by all Members States of the League of Nations. However, despite strong 
support from many countries, the United States successfully opposed an 
inclusion claiming that such an undertaking would constitute interference in 
the domestic and political affairs of states.16  
 
Instead, it was eventually agreed by the Member States to include a 
provision (Article 55(a)) which states that the United Nations shall promote 
“higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic 
and social progress and development, but which omits a follow-up 
mechanism at the international level.17 
 
In 1948 the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted 
by the General Assembly. It contained a number of socio-economic rights 
                                                 
12 Alston & Steiner, p. 242.  
13 Ibid..  
14 Ibid.. 
15 Ibid.. 
16 Ibid and Burgenthal, Shelton and Stewart p. 31. 
17 Ibid.. 
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such as the right to work, just and favourable conditions of work, protection 
against unemployment, education and social security. However, the UDHR 
was not a legally binding document and the opposition on the part of, 
mainly the United States, prevented the adoption of a more legally binding 
instrument. 
 
The US resistance at the time should not be confused as implying that it 
totally rejected the concept of economic and social rights. In the contrary, 
President Roosevelt had declared that “freedom from want” was one of the 
four freedoms that should characterise the future world order.18 
 
However, during the so-called Cold War period after the Second World 
War, western governments and the United States championed civil and 
political rights while the Communist Governments stressed the importance 
of economic, social and cultural rights as a counterweight to their obvious 
lack of civil and political rights.19  
 
Owing to this ideological divide, insisting on the essential differences 
between the two sets of rights, western states successfully lobbied in the UN 
General Assembly that the UN Commission on Human Rights, which was 
established by the member states to gradually develop a universal human 
rights system, should draft two different monitoring mechanisms. This was 
not accepted by the socialist and southern states who managed to delay and 
water down the contents of the work of the Commission and it was not until 
1966 that the two drafts, ICCPR and ICESCR, were adopted and a further 
10 years before they entered into force. 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, better 
opportunities were provided to move away from these polarised positions. 
 
Industrialised nations in the north started to develop a human rights activism 
towards the south, which in practice was limited to civil and political rights 
such as “democratisation”, “good governance” and “the rule of law”.  
Developing countries in their turn perceived this as a form of “human rights 
colonialism and pointed out the importance of the right to development.20  
 
It was during this period the notion of the indivisibility and interdependence 
of all human rights surfaced as it was obvious that the universality of all 
human right would be accepted if it included all the different types of rights, 
including socio-economic rights. Hence, in order to safeguard the principle 
of universality and the related legitimacy of their international protection 
agenda, the north, including the United States, finally agreed to accept the 
principles of indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and 
hence recognise rights such as the right to development and socio-economic 
rights.21  
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Robinsson, M,. P. 866.  
20 Ibid., p. 868. 
21 Nowak, M. p. 24-26. 
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This compromise is laid down in paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration of 
1993. 
 
“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated. The International community must treat human rights globally 
in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis.”  
 
However, with regard to the international protection of economic, social and 
cultural rights, there still exist several weaknesses if compared with the 
international protection of civil and political rights. This is reflected both in 
the different formulations of state obligations in Article 2 of the respective 
Covenants as well as in the adoption and prevalence of different monitoring 
mechanisms.  
 
Under the ICCPR, state parties undertake to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognised in the covenant. Whereas, a state party to the ICESCR only 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international cooperation, 
to the maximum of its resources and with a view to progressively realise the 
rights in the Covenant. In addition, there is an Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR that gives a possibility for individuals to communicate human rights 
violations to the Human Rights Committee in situations where the violating 
state has signed the Protocol. Such an individual complaints mechanism in 
terms of an Optional Protocol does not yet exist within the ICESCR 
framework.  
2.3 The significance of the dignity notion 
and the inherent value of socio-economic 
rights 
During the last decades rights-based paradigms have gained influence and 
they stress the fact that the dignity of an individual should not be divided 
into two different spheres, i.e. one of civil and political and another of 
economic, social and cultural rights. The individual should enjoy both 
freedom from want as well as freedom from fear.22  
 
Or in other words, the dignity of an individual cannot be realized unless that 
person is enjoying all of his or her rights.  
 
Rights-based approaches stress the distinction between a right and a need. A 
right is something to which a person is entitled, simply by virtue of being a 
human, and which enables the person to lead a life in dignity. The 
government is obliged to honour the right and the right is enforceable before 
the government. A need, in the contrary, is something that a person can 
                                                 
22 Circle of Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Activism, p. 4.  
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legitimately aspire to, but the government is not necessarily required to cater 
for it. The satisfaction of a need cannot be enforced.23 
 
Owing to this, a right is defined on the basis of dignity and enjoyed on basis 
of “being a human”. Whereas, needs are associated with “having”. What a 
person “has” can be negotiated and form a part of social or economic 
program of a country, but rights and the dignity concept linked to them are 
non-negotiable.  
 
Obviously, political programs are a prerequisite to obtain and honour human 
rights, but they cannot act as a substitute for them. Political programs and 
priorities change overtime while the dignity of an individual is unchanging 
and transcends cultural particularities.24 
 
In many societies, and in line with the notion that socio-economic rights 
only constitute aspirations, entitlements such as right to food, health, 
housing and education are considered merely as instruments to achieving 
ends such as development and economic growth. As mentioned earlier, this 
conception of socio-economic rights leads to the idea that the realization of 
these rights can only be achieved progressively as their enjoyment is linked 
to the availability of resources. As a result, the old “negative and positive 
categorization of rights” is on the forefront. Here, as mentioned earlier, civil 
and political rights are immediately enforceable whereas socio-economic 
rights are subject to positive interventions by the state. However, such an 
approach to socio-economic entitlements undermines the fundamental 
principle that human rights are something that cannot be negotiated or taken 
away. Consequently, it is imperative to establish what can be described as 
the inherent value of socio-economic rights and the fact that they are an end 
in and of themselves.  
 
The acclaimed economist Amartya Sen has provided valuable insights as to 
the inherent value of socio-economic rights.25 He has put forward a 
“capability approach” that links capability with freedom, i.e. the possibility 
a person has to freely decide how to live his life. Poverty and, for instance, 
premature mortality circumscribes an individual’s possibility to live a 
normal life and illiteracy hinders a person to enjoy his freedoms to read and 
write.26  
 
Enjoyment of socio-economic rights increases the capabilities of individuals 
and hence their freedom. If poverty is viewed as a non-fulfilment of 
capabilities, the remedy could be the emergence of calls for pertinent social 
arrangements and placing of obligations on states. As illustrative examples, 
Sen has indicated five ways in which the entitlements of education and 
health increase the freedom of an individual.27  
                                                 
23 Ibid.. 
24 Ibid., p. 7.  
25 Sen, A. K., p, 23. 
26 Ibid.. 
27 Ibid., p. 18. 
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1. Being an educated and healthy person is directly linked to an 
individual’s effective freedom and is also a valuable accomplishment 
in itself (inherent importance).  
2. If an individual is healthy and educated, that also enables him or her 
to achieve many other valuable things, other than just being educated 
and healthy. The individual’s good health can help him to obtain a 
job and to earn a livelihood. The increase in economic means can, in 
turn, result in enhanced freedom and better possibilities to obtain 
things that the individual in question values (instrumental individual 
role).     
3. Literacy and education enables the individual to participate in public 
discussions on social needs and also encourage individuals to make 
collective demands. For the society as a whole this can in turn 
contribute to better use of the society’s resources (instrumental 
social role).  
4. Education, apart from its manifest role as formal education, can also, 
as a process, have other positive outcomes, such as making children 
interact with each other (instrumental process role). 
5. With better education and improved literacy, disadvantaged groups 
have better possibilities to increase their ability to stand up to 
oppression and discrimination by way of political participation and 
organisation. With education and good health they would also be in 
a stronger position to obtain fairer allotments of other social goods 
(empowerment of distributive roles).28 
                                                 
28 Ibid.. 
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3 The nature of socio-
economic rights 
3.1 The normative framework 
Today economic and social rights are recognised as an essential part of the 
international human rights law framework. The UDHR, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and most 
importantly the ICESCR, all make explicit reference to economic and social 
rights.  
 
Moreover, on the regional level, many human rights instruments such as the 
African Charter of Human and People’s rights and the European Social 
Charter address economic and social rights. Socio-economic rights are also 
widely recognised in most legal systems, albeit not to the same extent as 
civil and political rights.  
 
The ICESCR (1966) is the foundational international human rights 
instrument on socio-economic rights. It recognises the rights to: 
 
• Self-determination (art. 1); 
• Equality for men and women (art.3); 
• Work and favourable conditions of work (arts. 6 and 7); 
• Form and join trade unions (art. 8); 
• Social security (art. 9); 
• Protection of the family, mothers and children (art. 10); 
• An adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing (art. 11); 
• The highest attainable level of health and health care (art. 12); 
• Education (art. 13); 
• Free and compulsory primary education (art. 14); 
 
As of March 2009, 149 states were parties to the Covenant and had hence 
voluntarily committed themselves to implement and give effect to the norms 
and provisions established by the Covenant.29  
 
South Africa has signed the Covenant in 1994, but has not yet ratified it.  
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural (hereinafter the 
“Committee”) is the international body designated to monitor states´ 
compliance with their obligations to the Covenant. States submit periodic 
reports to the Committee which issues its concluding observations on these 
                                                 
29 This goes without saying that some states may have made reservations to one or more of 
the articles in the Covenant and are hence not bound by them.  
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reports. In addition, the committee has adopted a number of general 
comments on the application and interpretation of the different provisions of 
the Covenant.  
 
Apart from the general comments adopted by the Committee, there are also 
several other authoritative documents that provide assistance when 
discussing the nature and substance of state obligations in regard to 
economic and social rights.  
 
In 1986, in Limburg, a group of international experts on international law 
met and developed a number of principles, the Limburg principles on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, on the obligations of states in relation to economic, social 
and cultural rights. The principles have gained significant normative 
authority and are widely used as a tool when interpreting the legal nature of 
the rights in the Covenant. An illustrative example of this is that the 
principles preceded the Committee’s General Comment number 3 of 1990 
on the nature of states parties’ obligations under the Covenant and that the 
principles were very influential when the Committee prepared its 
comments.30  
 
In 1997 the Limburg principles were complemented by guidelines prepared 
in another meeting in Maastricht when experts on international law agreed 
on the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. The guidelines provide guidance on, inter alia, 
responsibility for violations of economic and social rights and the 
entitlements of victims to effective remedies.  
3.2 State obligations 
The basic obligations of states in regard to economic and social rights are 
outlined in article 2 of the ICESCR.  
 
Article 2 provides: 
 
1. Each State party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures  
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee 
that the right enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.  
                                                 
30 Chapman, A., p. 27. 
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3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their 
national economy, may determine to what extent they would 
guarantee the economic rights recognised in the present Covenant to 
non-nationals.  
 
The cited provision can be broken down to a number of important 
principles, namely:  
 
• the state “undertakes to take steps… by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”; 
• “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights”; 
• “to the maximum of its available resources”; 
• “without discrimination”; 
• “Through international assistance and cooperation”. 
• The obligation to respect. 
• The obligation to protect. 
• The obligation to fulfil.  
3.2.1 The state’s obligations to take steps… by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures 
It is stipulated in article 2.1 of the ICESCR that states are required to 
immediately undertake measures aiming at full enjoyment by every one of 
the various rights in the Covenant.  
 
In practice, in most cases, this requires some form of legislative measures, 
especially if the applicable rights are to be enforceable. However, legislation 
is not always a sufficient response to the obligations of the Covenant, 
especially if these rights are to be enjoyed by everyone without 
discrimination. Other necessary steps may include adoption of policies and 
administrative, judicial, educational, social and economic measures.  
 
Legislative measures might, however, be obligatory when existing laws are 
manifestly inconsistent with the obligations of the Covenant. This could be 
the case when an existing law is discriminatory or when the law allows for 
the violation of a right enshrined in the Covenant.31  
3.2.2 The progressive realization component 
It is often assumed that the fact that the Covenant contains a progressive 
realization component implies that economic and social rights can only be 
realized when a country is economically developed or has reached a certain 
level of development.  
 
                                                 
31 Limburg Principles 17-20.  
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This assumption is incorrect and is not in accordance with either the intent 
or the legal intention of the ICESCR. Paragraph 9 of General Comment 
number 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 
nature of States Parties’ obligations, clarifies that there is a duty upon states 
to, notwithstanding the level of national wealth, to move as quickly as 
possible towards the realization of economic and social rights. This implies 
that available resources should immediately be used equitable and 
effectively.32 
 
The measures should not be contingent on the availability of resources, but 
available resources should be used effectively with a view to achieve the 
goal of implementing the rights of the Covenant.33 While the rights in the 
Covenant can be achieved progressively, immediate steps have to be taken 
by the state to reach the goal of fulfilling is obligations.34 In principle, this 
would mean that the state must develop targeted and sufficient policies that 
will progressively assure the rights of the Covenant.  
Social and economic indicators are frequently used as a tool to measure 
progress in this regard. The Limburg principles stress that progressive 
implementation is not only dependent on the increase in resources, but also 
by the development of societal resources that are necessary for everyone’s 
enjoyment of the rights of the Covenant.35   
 
Some right in the Covenant are not at all linked to the progressive 
realization notion. The non-discrimination provision (Art, 2.2.) and the 
obligation of States Parties to refrain from actively violating the rights of the 
Covenant are obviously to be implemented immediately. The same applies 
to the obligation to refrain from withdrawing protection of these rights.36 
 
The Committee on Social Economic and Cultural Rights has stressed that 
policies and legislation should not be designed to benefit already 
advantaged groups at the expense of other groups.37 
3.2.3 To the maximum of its resources 
When discussing a state’s resources in the context of the “maximum of its 
resources” notion of the Covenant, it should be pointed out that the notion 
includes both national resources and international aid in terms of for 
instance economic and technical assistance.  
 
According to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, resource scarcity is not a valid argument for lifting a 
                                                 
32 Limburg Principle 21. 
33 Limburg Principle 23. 
34 Limburg Principle 16. 
35 Principle 24.  
36 Limburg Principle 22.  
37 General Comment number 4 on the right to adequate housing, paragraph 11.  
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State’s minimum obligations as to the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights.38  
 
What is important here is that even if the state cannot satisfy a right, it has to 
demonstrate a full commitment that, in aggregate, the measures it takes are 
sufficient to realize the right for every individual in the shortest time 
possible and in conformity with its maximum available resources.39   
 
Many of the measures that are necessary will in one way or another include 
resource allocations and policy initiatives of a general nature.40 In principle 
this means that states are obliged to give priority to treaty obligations before 
other policy areas. This has bearing on for instance taxation policies as 
states must collect enough tax revenues to be able to meet the rights in the 
Covenant. The Committee has stated that in cases where there is no visible 
identifiable justification for a limitation in public expenditure on programs 
aiming at realising socio-economic rights, the state might have violated the 
Covenant.41  
 
Needless to say, this is a sensitive area and the Committee has had problems 
qualifying whether or when, within the framework of maximum resources, 
public expenditures geared towards fulfilment of the rights in the Covenant 
are sufficient in relation to overall expenditure. Nevertheless, in its 
comments it has implied that there must be a reasonable justification for a 
lowering of public expenditure.42  
3.2.4 Without discrimination 
Article 2.2 of the Covenant prohibits the state to apply discriminatory 
practices. The prohibition also applies to third parties on its territory, i.e. 
private persons and bodies. Those who are subjected to such discriminatory 
practices should have access to judicial and other resource procedures. The 
prohibited grounds for discrimination enumerated in the article, race, colour, 
language, sex, religion, political or other opinion, are not exhaustive. 
Discrimination in this context also includes all other grounds, such as age 
and income level, that may have a negative effect on an individual’s 
enjoyment of the rights in the Covenant.    
 
Limburg Principle 37 prescribes that when a state becomes party to the 
Covenant, it shall eliminate de jure discrimination by abolishing without 
delay any discriminatory laws and practices affecting an individual’s 
enjoyment of the rights in the Covenant. De facto discrimination should be 
brought to an end as speedily as possible.43  
                                                 
38 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, guideline 
10.  
39 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment number 4 
on the right to adequate housing, paragraph 14.  
40 Ibid.. 15. 
41 Ibid..  
42 Ibid.. 
43 Limburg Principle 38. 
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Special measures such as affirmative action schemes are not deemed as 
discriminatory provided that they are only temporary, i.e. they shall not be 
continued after their planned objectives have been met and when they do not 
lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different groups.44  
3.2.5 Through international assistance and 
cooperation 
The Covenant envisages that not all states have the resources they need to 
ensure the immediate and full realisation of all the rights in the document. 
Therefore, as described above, the covenant contains notions such as 
“progressive realisation” and “to the maximum of its resources”. However, 
the Covenant requires that in those instances where a state cannot 
immediately fulfil all the rights in the Covenant, it should accept external 
assistance for its programme of progressive realisation. As mentioned 
earlier, external assistance is in this context considered as part of a state’s 
available resources. Consequently, a state is not allowed to adopt isolationist 
policies when international assistance is available and, at the same, it is 
unable to meet its obligations in regard to economic and social rights.45  
 
The stipulation on international assistance works both ways. States that 
possess adequate means to assist another state has an obligation to do so. If 
they do not, they should be held accountable for their omissions.46  
3.2.6 The obligations to respect, to protect and 
to fulfil 
Apart from the obligations explicitly mentioned in article 2.1 of the 
ICESCR, there are some general obligations, within the legal framework of 
economic and social rights.  
 
Guideline 6 of the Maastricht guidelines states that, like civil and political 
rights, socio-economic rights impose three different types of obligations on 
states, i.e. the obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfil. If in default to 
perform any of these obligations, the state has violated one of the rights in 
the Covenant.  
 
The obligation to respect economic and social rights implies that states must 
refrain from taking any actions that infringe on an individual’s enjoyment of 
economic and social rights. This relates to for instance an individual’s right 
to not be arbitrarily evicted or arbitrarily denied access to education or 
health care institutions or any other services related to socio-economic 
rights. An important aspect in this context is respect for the right to popular 
participation as the government must create economic and social conditions 
                                                 
44 Ibid., principle 39. 
45 Ibid., principle 40 
46 Ibid.. 
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that are conducive to self-help initiatives. The same applies to respect for 
freedom of assembly which is imperative for the assertion of demands by 
groups entitled to economic and social rights.47  
 
The obligation to protect economic and social rights means that a state and 
is institutions must prevent that an individual’s rights are violated by the 
other individuals or non-state entities.  
 
Legal remedies must be available if a third party violates an individual’s 
rights and the state should take measures to stop the violations from 
continuing. In this respect, it is also imperative that an individual is through 
active measures protected from all forms of discrimination, threats and 
harassment that could violate his enjoyment of economic and social rights.48  
 
It is important to stress that private actors are capable of violating economic 
and social rights and that the state has an obligation to protect the 
individual. Any encouragement or neglect on part of the government in 
protecting an individual from acts perpetrated by, for instance, corporations, 
organisations, churches, teachers or any other private entity or individual 
constitute a situation in which the state has not fulfilled its obligation to 
protect.49  
 
The obligation to fulfil implies that a state must, in a situation where earlier 
measures have not been sufficient or otherwise not been successful, to 
undertake positive measures with a view to ensure the full realisation of the 
right in question. Or in other words, fill the gaps in socio-economic rights 
protection.  
 
In practice this implies for instance adoption of redistributive taxation 
policies, provision of basic public services, programs on infrastructure or 
simply legislative and policy reviews of pertinent laws or regulations having 
negative influence on the fulfilment of economic and social rights.50   
3.3 Minimum core obligations  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in its 
General Comment No. 3 of 1990 that States have a minimum core 
obligation under the ICESCR to ensure that individuals enjoy a basic level 
of enjoyment of each economic, social and cultural right.  
 
“…the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party 
in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or 
                                                 
47 Chapman, A, p. 43. 
48 Maastricht Guidelines 16 and 18.  
49 Ibid., and Limburg Principle 40.   
50 Maastricht Guideline 17. 
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of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its 
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a 
way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely 
deprived of its raison d`etre.”51  
 
In the same document the Committee went on to qualify its statement by 
admitting that such a minimum core obligation must be considered in light 
of the resource constraints faced by a state. Hence it has concluded that;  
 
“In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least 
its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources, it must 
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at 
its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations”52 
 
Limburg Principle 25 states that parties to the Covenant are under the 
obligation “to guarantee respect for the minimum rights of survival for all” 
and independent of available resources.  
 
The problem is however that there is no exact standard that indicates what 
constitutes the minimum norm of observance.  
 
The Committee describes the minimum core obligation as an obligation 
upon states to realise minimum essential levels of a right which indicates 
that there are different levels to the realisation of a right. Consequently, this 
means that some levels are more essential than other levels.53  
 
The Committee’s approach was heavily influenced by academics such as 
Bart-Anders Andreassen who in their turn were inspired by Henry Shue’s 
idea that it is possible to identify a list of basic rights that are necessary for 
the exercise of all other rights. Andreassen and other scholars applied this 
idea to the Covenant itself by establishing the notion that there was a level 
of effective self-provision. Reaching this level would make it possible for 
the poor to attain further progressive steps of development and enjoyment of 
the longer list of rights in the Covenant.54  
 
The scholars exemplified this by giving the illustrative example of poor 
people living in rural Botswana. The prevalence of high malnutrition levels 
hindered these people in their efforts to bring in a good crop for a 
sustainable food security. The inadequate levels of nutrition created a 
situation where it was impossible for these people to achieve more adequate 
and higher levels of nutrition, health or education. Consequently, minimum 
levels or thresholds of a right are those that are imperative for a person’s 
                                                 
51 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, para. 
10.  
52 Ibid.. 
53 Bilchitz, D., p. 186. 
54 Ibid.. 
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enjoyment of other and higher levels of socio-economic rights in the 
future.55  
 
In the context of the application of the Covenant and the interpretation of 
the minimum threshold obligation put forward by the Committee, there has 
been a discussion on whether this obligation mainly applies to a society-
wide or communal level of enjoyment or whether it applies to the individual 
enjoyment of a right.56 The advocates for a minimum threshold approach 
have favoured the former position suggesting, inter alia, that the scope of a 
violation of economic and social rights would refer to the percentage of the 
population not enjoying the right at the level of the minimum threshold.57  
 
Under any circumstances, the minimum core obligations must be viewed as 
an initial step and not the conclusion of realising economic and social rights. 
It cannot be interpreted as suggesting that only the minimum core of a 
certain rights is justiciable.58  
 
It goes without saying that the issue of defining what is the minimum core 
content of economic and social rights has been surrounded by a lot of 
controversy and much debate. On the one side, there are critics that base 
their arguments on the difficulties involved in establishing universally 
accepted standards. Whereas, on the other side, others have maintained the 
argument that there is a need to define the minimum core of every right in 
the Covenant as it would provide a uniform framework in which some 
identified baselines must be respected by all states, including those who 
operate under insufficient financial resources. According to them this would 
promote realisation of the right and ensure equity in regard to distribution of 
resources.59 
3.4 Retrogressive measures 
A retrogressive measure is one that directly or indirectly results in a 
negative backward step in relation to a right recognised by the Covenant. An 
example of such a retrogressive measure would be the introduction of new 
legislation that decreases public expenditure on education causing increased 
illiteracy. 
 
The Committee discourages such measures but it has limited its criticism to 
only include deliberate retrogressive measures.  
 
It has commented that retrogressive measures; 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid.. 
56 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, p. 22. 
57 Ibid., p. 23.  
58 Ibid.. 
59 Ibid.. 
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“Would need to be justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided 
for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum 
available resources”.60 
 
A measure that has the unintentional consequence of reducing the 
enjoyment of a right does not have to be a violation of a Covenant right in 
terms of a deliberate retrogressive measure. However, the state is obliged, 
under its general obligation under the Covenant, to immediately correct its 
measure once it becomes aware of the negative unintended consequences. 
 
It is part of the obligation to progressively realise economic and social rights 
that no regression by concrete action or omission to a lower level of a right 
is permissible.61 
                                                 
60 General Comment No 3., para. 9.  
61 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, p. 28. 
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4 Constitutionalism and the 
role of the judiciary as 
protectors of socio-economic 
rights 
4.1 The role of constitutions 
Constitutions are often, in conventional institutionalist definitions seen as 
institutional frameworks that place constitutional limits in terms of a 
supreme law on the exercise of power by the government. Principles 
enshrined in the constitution to this end often include the separation of 
powers, strict requirements regarding amendments of the constitution, a bill 
of rights and establishment of bodies that enforce and guard the constitution 
such as a court with powers of judicial review.62  
 
Therefore, in most legal systems, constitutions serve the roles of 
frameworks for the distribution and exercise of power. In liberal 
democracies constitutions are seen as protecting the rights of citizens from 
both infringements by the state and from majority decisions. These rights 
are often included in a so-called Bill of Rights that defines fundamental 
rights and liberties of citizens within a country as well as the obligations of 
the state pertaining to the applicable rights.63  
 
However, there are several features that distinguish a Bill of Rights from 
other legal provisions of human rights character. 
 
Firstly, it provides a stable framework for the political and legal institutions 
in the country as it forms part of the constitution, which is normally meant 
to be of long duration.64  
 
Secondly, it is written and enshrined in one of a few written key legal 
documents-65  
 
Thirdly, it is part of the superior law of the country and all other laws that 
are not in conformity with it are rendered invalid or inapplicable.66  
 
Fourthly, it is justiciable, in the sense that it prescribes judicial procedures 
in which judges can test the compatibility of ordinary legislation with the 
constitution-67  
                                                 
62 Van Huyssteen, E, p. 246. 
63 Hirschl, R., p. 3. 
64 Kavanagh, A., p. 960. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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Lastly, it is relatively entrenched as to future amendments which are more 
difficult when compared with ordinary legislation.68 
4.2 The separation of powers doctrine 
Owing to the need to legitimise the exercise of state power in a democracy, 
constitutions serve as a tool to demarcate the extent of state power and to 
establish mechanisms to ensure that the persons and institutions that hold 
the power can be held accountable.69  
 
The separation of powers doctrine is a basic feature of many democratic 
systems all over the world that have accepted that there is a vital need to, 
through a constitution, impose checks and balances on the three bodies of 
the state, i.e.  the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.  
 
In its original form, as described in the works of Locke and Montesquieu, 
the doctrine guards against an over-concentration of power by dividing the 
powers and functions of the state in the three mentioned sectors.70  
 
This does not imply that the separation of powers is absolute.71 On the 
contrary in most cases its boundaries are changeable and undetermined in 
order to enable, inter alia, administrative expedience. The stringency of the 
original doctrine has been ameliorated by the development of practices more 
geared towards “checks and balances” as can be seen in the American 
constitutional system where the different government branches monitor and 
counterbalance the exercise of power by one another.72 
 
In constitutional democracies the legislature usually performs several 
distinct functions. First, it is a representative body whose members are 
elected directly by the public and it provides a mechanism through which 
citizens can participate in public affairs and government. Second, it is a 
forum in which governments can be held accountable for their actions. 
Third, it acts as a law-making body.73 Therefore, in the human rights field, 
as in other policy areas, it is generally accepted that the legislature has the 
main role with regard to giving content to human rights by means of 
legislation and policies. The problem is that it cannot be expected that 
popularly elected laymen possess the technical expertise required to deal 
with all complex aspects concerning human rights and social rights in 
particular. In addition, there is no guarantee that popular mandate guarantees 
respect for human rights and the social needs of marginalised and vulnerable 
groups in society such as for instance minorities.   
 
                                                                                                                            
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Pieterse, M., p. 4. 
70 Ibid.. 
71 Pieterse, M., p. 5. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Evans C. and Evans S, 2006, p. 548. 
 25
Much owing to the fact that the legislature has lost some of its political 
dominance in many political systems due to the technical and specialist 
nature of law-making, much of the political power and influence on giving 
content to human rights today rests with the executive as it controls the 
finance and manpower of the state administration.  
 
The role of courts in such constitutional systems that include separation of 
powers involves allowing judges to examine legislative or executive acts for 
their conformity with the constitution including the Bill of Rights, and then 
to rule that such acts are invalid if they are not in conformity with the 
constitution. Such powers imply that judges provide authoritative 
interpretations of the constitution and the Bill of Rights which can result in 
rendering actions taken by the executive and legislature as invalid if the 
actions violate principles and rights in the constitution. It should be noted 
though that this does not mean that decision-making by the majoritarian 
institutions, the legislature and the executive, is replaced by judicial 
decision-making. It is rather a question of review as the initial policy 
decisions have already been taken by the majoritarian institutions. An 
obvious counter-majoritarian problem is however inherent in such a review 
as a final decision concerning a specific issue can be imposed by the court 
against the will of the majority in a society.  
 
Evidently, such counter-majoritarian decisions by judges could be regarded 
as non-democratic. However, in constitutional theory there are several 
justifications for giving review powers to courts. Firstly, it is argued that 
such a review enhances democracy as it guards the boundaries of democracy 
by policing that also the minority can exercise its democratic rights such as 
the right to vote. Secondly, there are rights-based justifications building on 
the concept of fundamental rights that must be guaranteed to all individuals 
in any society, even if the majority does not have any interest whatsoever to 
recognise these rights.74   
 
Such justifications are in most instances readily accepted by people with 
regard to civil and political rights. However, politically more salient 
controversies are frequently raised over the judiciary’s role, within a system 
of separation of powers, in social rights cases.  
4.3 The issue of political resource 
allocation and polycentric problems  
Decisions on the allocation of limited resources between different interests 
and questions such as “who gets what, when and how” are very central 
elements in everyday politics.75 Therefore, such decisions have been 
regarded as belonging to the spheres of political economy and, in 
accordance with the separation of powers doctrine, strictly assigned to the 
elected executive and legislatures who can be held accountable for their 
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decisions in general elections. Unelected and unaccountable courts whose 
function it is to simply declare and interpret the law and who do not have 
the required expertise to decide on matters such as resource allocation, have 
been viewed as unsuitable to assume such a managerial role.  
 
Furthermore, inherent in all decisions concerning resource allocation is that 
it involves a complex weighting of possible competing uses of the resources 
against each other, which requires that the decision-maker has access to all 
the information and what can be described as the “full picture”. However, in 
most cases the information available to the court will be limited and 
insufficient and it will not be able to take in to account the whole situation 
of interacting interests and repercussions of its adjudication on the matter.76 
 
On the other side, the legislature and executive have access to a wide range 
of expertise on economic issues. The problem is closely linked to the 
concept of polycentricity introduced by Lon Fuller.77 
 
Fuller describes a polycentric problem as one that involves a complex web 
of interrelated relationships where a change in one factor produces a series 
of unintended/incalculable changes to other factors. These relationships 
have centres that interact and in which different actors interact with each 
other in different ways such as like by means of negotiation. A problem that 
has a profusion/blend of such interacting centres is one that can be described 
as “many-centred” or “polycentric”. An example of a polycentric question is 
how to fix an appropriate wage. Setting the wage of an employee affects the 
demand for employment, and consequently affects several other costs and 
factors78.  
 
Fuller’s intention was to show what social tasks are suitable for courts to 
handle and which are not. Those tasks which were not would better be left 
to legislatures or the market because of their unsuitability for adjudicative 
disposition and the legislature’s better position to strike a balance between 
rival claims. Consequently, he developed what can be viewed as a theory of 
adjudication: 
 
This whole analysis of the optimum and essential conditions for the 
functioning of adjudication will derive from one simple proposition, namely, 
that the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it 
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the 
decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in 
his favour… Whatever destroys that participation destroys the integrity of 
adjudication itself.79 
 
Inherent in Fuller’s theory is the issue of complexity. He puts great 
importance to the mode of participation that is accorded to the affected party 
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in the adjudication. However, the issue at stake here is not what can be 
called the moral or ethical aspects of participation, but rather the fact that 
the greater the number of affected but unrepresented parties, the more 
complex the issue becomes with regard to unintended consequences and 
adverse impacts. It is important to stress that, on the one hand, something 
can be complex without being polycentric as many scientific questions can 
be highly complicated without being polycentric as the answer may only 
affect one person and, on the other hand, that issues are often complex in the 
sense that it is difficult to know who will be affected by a change of a 
circumstance in one particular context. Hence, it is a cumbersome task to 
even identify who should be called to the court or allowed to intervene in 
the proceedings.80  
 
In conclusion, the realisation of social rights is often resource dependent and 
decisions related to them tend to deal with “distributive justice” i.e. how 
scarce resources should be allocated between different sectors such as 
between health and infrastructure or health and education. Moreover, 
especially in less developed countries, the necessarily progressive 
realization of these rights is dependent on a complex interaction of policies 
and programs in different policy areas and institutions.81  
 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that judicial review on civil and 
political rights has rarely been questioned in the same manner, despite the 
fact that the realization of many of these rights also often requires massive 
expenditure and which consequently can have an influence on the overall 
allocation of resources.82 For instance, court orders on the holding of 
elections, provision of legal aid and rights related to jail sentences all have 
budgetary consequences.  
4.4 Inclusion of socio-economic rights in 
a constitution and their justiciability 
Today most constitutions contain rights provisions and especially provisions 
that relate to civil and political rights. However, the traditional notion of the 
separation of powers doctrine discussed above and the problems with 
decisions related to resource allocation become intense where a Bill of 
Rights containing socio-economic rights is included as that would involve 
the judiciary in decisions which have budgetary impact. 
 
Some critics allude that when social and economic guarantees are enshrined 
in a constitution, courts risk assuming a role for which they are ill-suited 
and what can be described as an untenable managerial position.83  
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Some commentators have stated that the inherent institutional logic of social 
and economic rights imply that they cannot be included in a constitution as 
judges lack the democratic legitimacy and competence to deal with such 
issues.84 These commentators concerns, that the judiciary does not have the 
legitimacy do adjudicate social and economic rights, are twofold.  
 
Firstly, if placed in that position, courts would have to interfere with the 
drawing of the budget which is considered as one of the main prerogatives 
of the legislature. Secondly, as resources are always, to at least some extent, 
scarce, interests protected by social and economic rights are therefore likely 
to conflict. Consequently, judges should exercise self-restraint towards 
economic issues and it is therefore doubtful whether such “choice-intensive” 
decisions should at all be subject to legal deliberation which raises the 
question of whether such rights are at all justiciable. Otherwise, they should 
only be subject to political deliberation. 
 
Justiciability has been defined as; 
 
“… a contingent and fluid notion dependant on various assumptions 
concerning the role of the judiciary in a given place at a given time as well 
as on its changing character and evolving capability, but may be broadly 
defined as the extent to which a matter is suitable for judicial 
determination”85  
 
The issue of justiciability and enforcement must be distinguished from the 
implementation of a court’s decision. In all legal systems courts normally 
maintain a role to enforce a remedy contained in a decision, should the 
remedy not be implemented. However, it applies to all rights, both civil and 
political as well as socio-economic rights that they are not always enforced.  
Justiciability is not the same as enforcement or implementation although the 
linkage between them is obvious.86  
 
Furthermore, the issue of whether socio-economic rights are justiciable is 
not a question of whether such rights can or should be the subject of 
national legislation or whether they can be enforced where such legislation 
exists. Obviously, legislation addressing rights such as right to education, 
health care, housing, pensions, social benefits and welfare and other socio-
economic concerns is commonplace and imperative in countries that 
generally respect human rights and whose national institutions including 
courts are accustomed to deal with issues related to such rights.  
 
The principle discussion and debate, as it exists, however, takes place at a 
different level. Should positive obligations to fulfil socio-economic rights be 
included in a constitution?  
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As can be deduced from the above discussions much of the justiciability 
issues focus on the question of legitimacy. Is the nature of such rights such 
that they should at all be included in a constitution and are courts 
institutionally competent to enforce them?87 Normally, constitutional norms 
constitute superior law that may invalidate or rectify national legislation or 
policies. They can also serve as guides to implementation of statutory 
provisions.88  
 
In practice, justiciability of a right is contingent on whether a court or an 
administrative body regards it as amenable to judicial scrutiny.  
 
As has been seen above, the unwillingness to accept economic and social 
rights as justiciable rights is closely linked to the idea that they are vaguely 
worded and resource demanding. Moreover, in the context of the separation 
of powers doctrine it is often argued that the judiciary does not have the 
necessary democratic legitimacy and that the judiciary therefore must 
exercise self-restraint towards economic issues. 
 
Nevertheless, also the protection of civil and political rights is a resource 
demanding enterprise, and such rights can also be vaguely worded. In this 
respect, all rights are positive rights in the sense that they have budgetary 
implications.89 Civil and political rights are not immune against delicate 
power balance issues between the judiciary and the legislature. However, 
these considerations are of quite limited practical value when discussing the 
justiciability of rights as the issues at stake is not whether a right has 
resource implications, but whether there are substantial legal grounds for 
asserting that a state has an obligation to ensure that resources are allocated 
for a certain end.90 Here it is unavoidable to not focus on the wording of the 
right and it is obvious that the acceptance of a right as a justiciable right is 
strengthened by the precision of the particular right. Consequently, the 
judiciary plays a role in enforcing what the legislature has positively and 
clearly decided as regards all rights, expensive and cost-free, be it economic 
and social or civil and political rights.91  
 
Arguments such as that the courts are already involved in matters that have 
resource implications are therefore not necessarily valid arguments 
supporting the justiciability of economic and social rights. In most cases the 
role of the courts is to verify that the legislature adheres to its human rights 
obligations and that the state’s institutions respect human rights law. If the 
law has clear and manifest budgetary implications then public spending will 
be a result of the courts’ judgements.92 The power balance between the 
judiciary and the legislator becomes highly relevant only in situations when 
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the judiciary can decide on resource-demanding issues without  a very clear 
legal basis.93  
 
Other commentators have argued that the real question is one of degree and 
that what matters is the size of the consequences court decisions have on 
budgets.94 Court orders enforcing socio-economic rights have almost always 
significant budgetary consequences while decisions on other rights are more 
likely to only have occasional or less severe implications.  
 
However, other commentators have objected to the argument that size 
matters. The size of the budgetary implications does not provide a strong 
argument for the judiciary to adopt a hands-off approach to adjudicating 
socio-economic claims. In the contrary, the judiciary needs to be particularly 
vigilant in seeing that the interests of individuals are protected when there 
are significant budgetary interests at stake, as it is here that governments are 
most likely to violate the interests of individuals.95  
 
Nevertheless, the size of the budgetary consequences may be a 
consideration that needs to be taken into account by the judiciary in its 
decisions, especially when translating conditional rights into unconditional 
rights. If the budgetary consequences are significant, it has bearing on 
polycentric outcomes and issues such as scarcity of resources which might 
result in that in some circumstances unconditional rights are never 
implemented. In these situations, it might be appropriate for the judiciary to 
give weight to the decisions made by other branches of government that 
have better competence to deal with these complex issues and who can 
better undertake the balancing act. This does not imply that the size of the 
budgetary consequences impacts on the urgency of human needs. Nor does 
it provide arguments for the executive and the legislator to neglect the 
priorities of the interests protected by economic and social rights.96  
 
In conclusion, the judiciary will have an important role, irrespective of the 
size of the budgetary consequences, in ascertaining that the government 
adhere to its obligations with respect to economic- and social rights.97  This 
does not mean that there is no general objection to judicial review when it 
comes to the judiciary determining the overall allocation of resources.  
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5 The constitutionalising of 
socio-economic rights in the 
South African Constitution 
Today, internationally, many states, including European states, have 
constitutions that contain some safeguards for the protection of socio-
economic rights.  
 
India and South Africa are most frequently quoted as the countries with the 
most advanced constitutional law jurisprudence on such rights.98 The Indian 
system has mainly developed through judicial interpretation of civil and 
political rights in the constitution such as the right to life, whereas in South 
Africa, by contrast, an express catalogue of economic, social and cultural 
rights has been included in the Constitution.  
5.1 The legacy of Apartheid  
In order to understand the South African Constitutional process it is 
important to understand the long legacy of inequality and poverty in the 
country that was the result of the previous Apartheid policies. 
 
Economic disparities were entrenched by Apartheid and during the last 15 
years of that era massive transfers of wealth took place from the poor to the 
rich. During the period 1975 to 1991 the income of the poorest dropped with 
60% while that of the whole population only dropped with 35%. In 1996 the 
gap between the rich and the poor was even larger as the poorest quintile 
received 4% of the total income, compared to 65% received by the richest 
quintile and 46% by the richest 10%.99  
 
Still today, South Africa is ranked as one of the most unequal societies in 
the world with great disparities in wealth. Millions of mainly black people 
are living in appalling circumstances and in abject poverty. Unemployment 
is high and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health 
services.100  
 
The inclusion of a broad range of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
1996 South African Constitution is supposed to reflect the new democracy’s 
commitment to reconstruct development and social justice for all.  
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However, Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court has described the 
sometimes ambivalent approach many black South Africans have had to a 
Bill of Rights and constitutionally protected human rights.   
 
In the mid 1980s a group of black law students at the University of Natal-
Durban in South Africa, created an association named the Anti-Bill of Rights 
Committee. First, Sachs was intrigued by the fact that the association 
comprising of idealistic students from the oppressed community chose to 
establish an association that was opposing the notion of a Bill of Rights 
instead of an association opposing Apartheid. However, when having 
understood the true motives of the students he felt some sympathy for their 
arguments. The group saw a bill of rights as a tool for the privileged white 
minority to maintain a status-quo by preventing future moves towards social 
and economic change. A Bill of Rights would effectively maintain the 
prevailing unfair distribution of socio-economic wealth created by the 
Apartheid regime and especially secure property rights. During the time, 
whites owned 87% of the land and 95% of all productive capital. A Bill of 
Rights was perceived by the black students as a hindrance for the state to 
equalise access to wealth resulting in that the underprivileged would remain 
poor, albeit formally emancipated. According to Sachs one commentator put 
it as that the Bill of Rights would in effect be a “Bill of Whites”.101 
 
The new interim South African Constitution of 1993 aimed to heal the 
divisions of the past and to establish a society based on democratic values 
and social justice. A number of economic and social rights were included, 
but rights such as the rights to housing and health care were not included. 
When preparing the final Constitution, one of the major issues was whether 
justiciable economic and social rights would be included in the Bill of 
Rights together with civil and political rights.102  
 
Therefore, it is understandable that consultations, participation and 
compromise involving all sectors of South African society were a 
significant characteristic and imperative part of the constitutionalisation 
process. 
 
Human rights groups, church groups, civil society organisations and trade 
groups strongly lobbied for the inclusion of economic and social rights in 
the bill of rights and 55 different organisations presented a joint petition to 
the Constitutional Assembly arguing that a constitution that did not 
recognise economic and social rights was not a constitution of the people. 
They were concerned that if only civil and political rights were included, the 
rich and powerful would succeed in maintaining the unequal distribution of 
wealth in the country by using civil rights such as the right to property to 
hinder social transformation. Instead they argued that the new democratic 
government should be given the constitutional mandate to redistribute 
resources by means of implementing economic and social rights. The 
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argumentation of the group was successful and economic and social rights 
were included in the draft final Constitution.103  
 
However, before the final Constitution could be adopted, the Constitutional 
Court had to certify that the provisions in the final Constitution were in 
conformity with the 34 constitutional principles enumerated in the interim 
Constitution and most importantly that it protected universally accepted 
fundamental rights, democracy and cultural diversity and prohibited all 
forms of discrimination.104  
 
During the certification process, some groups such as the Gauteng 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Free Market Foundation 
entered the stage and fiercely called into question the inclusion of socio-
economic rights. Their main arguments were that an inclusion would violate 
the constitutional principle of separation of powers as an inclusion would 
give judges the power to dictate what would be the social policies and 
budget principles of the parliament and the executive. Furthermore, 
according to the group, economic and social rights were not proper 
justiciable rights as they were not universally accepted fundamental rights. 
This argument was contested, in consultations, by organisations such as the 
South African Legal Resources Centre, Centre for Applied Legal studies 
and the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape who 
all defended the inclusion of economic and social rights.105 
 
In its first certification judgement the Constitutional Court held that: 
 
• Many civil and political rights such as equality, freedom of speech 
and the right to a fair trial may also result in courts making orders 
that affect budgets. 
• The inclusion of socio-economic rights does not automatically mean 
breaking the principle of a separation of powers.106 
• The fact that socio-economic rights affect the budget does not mean 
that they cannot be enforced by the courts. 
• At the very minimum the courts can protect socio-economic rights 
from “improper invasion”.107 
 
Upon certifying the final Constitution on 4 December 1996 the Constitution 
came into force on 4 February 1997. 
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5.2 Constitutional supremacy in South 
Africa 
The constitutional form of democracy chosen in post-Apartheid South 
Africa can be described as one of constitutional supremacy with judicial 
review.108 Constitutional supremacy gives significant formal influence to 
the judiciary with regard to decisions on as varied subjects as abortion, t
death penalty and the distribution of social benefits.  
he 
                                                
 
In the South African context this is particularly interesting as the 
legislature’s broad and ambitious socio-economic transformation agenda 
became open to judicial review by the courts when it was democratically 
representative for the first time in South African history.109  
 
The Constitutional Court in South Africa is the highest court in all 
constitutional matters. 
5.3 Constitutional interpretation in South 
Africa 
In two early judgements the Constitutional Court outlined its theoretical 
method to constitutional interpretation.  
 
In South Africa v. Zuma110 the judges stated that they would adopt a 
purposive and generous approach to interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
However, in the case, judge Kentridge, stressed that:  
 
“Whilst we must always be conscious of the values underlying the 
Constitution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. I 
am well aware of the fallacy of supposing that general language must have 
a single objective meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one’s 
personal and intellectual and moral preconceptions. Yet it cannot be too 
strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we might 
wish it to mean”.111 
 
In a second case, South Africa v. Makwayne112, judge Chaskalson reiterated 
the Court’s generous and purposive approach to constitutional interpretation 
and that the interpretation should give expression to the underlying values of 
the Constitution. In this he emphasised that the “Constitution must be 
interpreted in the light of our own history and conditions with due regard to 
aspirations articulated in it”.113 In the judgement it was recognised that the 
 
108 Jagwanth, S., p. 9.  
109 Ibid.. 
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112 South Africa v. Makwayne, 1995 (3) SA391 (CC). 
113 Ibid., para 9.  
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social context of the case, high level of criminality in South Africa, must be 
taken into consideration. In the case Chaskalson refers to the underlying 
values of the Constitution and here it should be noted that the Constitution 
itself identifies some central values underlying the Bill of Rights, namely 
human dignity, equality and freedom.  
 
Section 7(1) of the Constitution provides that  
 
This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It 
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.  
5.4 Judicial independence in South Africa 
In early 2005 the ANC (African National Congress) National Executive 
Committee issued a statement that the “collective mindset” of the country’s 
judiciary had to change to keep with the “vision and aspirations” of the 
majority of South Africa’s population.  
 
This statement was by many interpreted as being a direct assault by the 
executive on the independence of the judiciary in the country. The statement 
was later played down by the ANC which claimed that it only wanted to 
stress the continuing importance of the need to transform the judiciary.  
 
Today, the discussion of the independence of the judiciary is intertwined 
with the perceived need to change the gender and racial compositions of the 
judiciary.114 The concerns are twofold.  
 
Firstly, both the superior and lower courts are predominantly composed by 
white men which fuel a popular perception that judges and magistrates are 
biased as to race and gender and hence not “independent”. There have been 
allegations that white male judges have failed to convict persons charged 
with inter-race crimes and to impose correct sentences.115  
 
Secondly, government programs aiming at rapidly transforming the racial 
and gender compositions of the courts have resulted in concerns that 
competent white male lawyers have been unfairly excluded from 
appointment to the court system and especially the High Court. Allegedly, 
the indirect result of this could be that the judicial independence is 
threatened as young inexperienced black judges and magistrates are in a 
eaker position to resist pressure from the executive and the legislature.116  w
 
In 2005 just over half of South Africa’s 207 superior court judges were 
white men and only 28 women of all races.  The Constitutional Court was 
one of the most racially representative courts in the country with five black 
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men, one black women and one Indian man out of a complement of 
eleven.117  
 
Rules concerning removal of judges are governed by Section 177 of the 
South African Constitution. It stipulates that a judge may only be removed 
from office before his or her term of office expires on grounds of incapacity, 
gross incompetence or gross misconduct, or if two-thirds of the National 
Assembly demands for such a removal. No judge has been subjected to such 
a removal since the enactment of the 1996 Constitution.  
5.5 The socio-economic rights enshrined 
in the South African Constitution 
The South African Constitution does not make any explicit distinction 
between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights in 
terms of their traditional division and categorisation. The Constitution 
contains a number of both categories of rights but the rights do not appear in 
any particular order which would indicate that there is a hierarchy among 
them.  
 
The provisions in the Constitution dealing with economic and social rights 
are the following.  
 
Section 26 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.  
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 
 
Section 27 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to- 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water, and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependents, appropriate social 
assistance. 
(1) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of each of these rights. 
(2) No one maybe refused emergency medical treatment.  
 
Section 29 
(1) Everyone has the right- 
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education, and 
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(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable 
measures, must make progressively available and accessible.  
(1) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language 
or their language of choice in public educational institutions where 
that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the 
effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must 
consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single 
medium institutions, taking into account- 
(a) equity, 
(b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory 
laws and practices. 
(1) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own 
expense, independent educational institutions that- 
(a) do not discriminate on the basis of race; 
(b) are registered with the state, and 
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at 
comparable public educational institutions  
 
As seen the rights are formulated in typical textual formulations of such 
rights, i.e. declaration of the right followed by textual limitations such as 
“progressive realisation” and subject to “available resources”. 
 
In the Constitution particular emphasis has been put on the rights of children 
and with regard to economic and social rights this means. 
 
Section 28 
 
(1) Every child has the right- 
… 
(b)            to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative 
care when removed from the family environment; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
social services; 
5.6 The role of international law in 
interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights 
International law played a key role in the drafting of both the interim and the 
final Constitutions and several provisions in the Bill of Rights are similar to 
the articles in the ICESCR.  
 
However, as mentioned earlier, South Africa has not yet ratified the 
ICESCR despite signing the instrument already in 1994.  
 
Art. 2 of the ICESCR states that states must “take steps … with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised” while 
Section 27(2) of the South African Constitution stipulates that in regard to 
the right of access to health care, food, water and social security, the State 
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“must take reasonable measures to … achieve the progressive realisation of 
each of these rights”. 
 
International human rights law is given a strong position in the 
interpretation of rights included in the Bill of Rights. Section 39 of the 
Constitution prescribes that when a court or other institution interprets a 
right in the Bill of Rights, it "must consider international law". 
 
In the case South Africa v. Makwanyane the Constitutional Court stated that 
both binding and non-binding international law can guide the interpretation 
of the rights in the Bill of Rights.118  
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6 Judicial review of socio-
economic rights in practice: 
The jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court 
6.1 The jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court 
Since the adoption of the new South African Constitution including the Bill 
of Rights, the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the Constitution has 
generated a rights jurisprudence that covers the issue of whether socio-
economic rights are justiciable and what the character of some of these 
rights is.  
 
Although a significant number of cases have appeared before the different 
courts in South Africa, commentators consider the following four decisions 
by the South African Constitutional Court as the existing framework for 
within which the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights can be 
assessed.119  
6.1.1 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 1997 (12) 
BCLR 1696 (CC) 
In Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, a 41-year-old unemployed terminally 
ill patient, Mr. Soobramoney, had been denied dialysis treatment by a public 
hospital in Durban. His life could be prolonged by means of regular renal 
dialysis and his argument was that, based on several constitutional 
provisions, the state was obliged to provide him with such treatment.  
 
Dialysis treatment takes four hours and is considered a time consuming 
exercise as an additional two hours are required after the treatment to clean 
the machine.  
 
There were limited facilities for renal dialysis in South Africa and the 
hospital in Durban was unable to provide dialysis to all those suffering from 
renal failure. Therefore, the hospital had had to adopt a policy that meant 
that only those with acute renal failure that could be treated and remedied by 
renal dialysis, or those who were eligible for kidney transplant, would be 
treated.  
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Mr. Soobramoney requested that the Court would instruct the State to avail 
funds for the renal clinic to provide dialysis for him.  
 
In the majority judgement, judge Chaskalson elaborated on the application 
of section 27(1) of the Constitution and commenced with explaining the 
context of the decision.  
 
He explained that there existed great disparities in wealth in South Africa 
and that there existed a high level of unemployment. Millions of people 
were living in abject poverty. Many of these people did not have access to 
drinking water or health care. He stressed that these conditions already 
existed before the adoption of the Constitution and that there was a 
commitment to address these problems with the adoption of the new 
Constitution. The aim was to transform the society in a way that there was 
human dignity, freedom and equality for all and that these principles would 
be at the heart of the new constitutional order.120  
 
He continued with stressing that the state’s obligations in regard to section 
27 were dependent on the availability of resources and that the right to 
health care itself is limited due to lack of resources. The problem with 
insufficient capacity concerning renal dialysis was a nationwide problem.121  
 
However, the guidelines and policies that had been adopted were fair and 
rational. They gave priority to patients that benefited the most and were 
geared towards curing of patients.122  
 
If, in the contrary, everyone in the same condition as Mr. Soobramoney 
were to be provided with the treatment, the sustainability of the existing 
programmes would be jeopardized as they would collapse and no one would 
benefit. The fact that if Mr. Soobramoney would be treated, others, in 
similar circumstances, would also have to be treated was stressed by the 
Court. Something that was not feasible given the lack of resources.123  
 
The Court held that it would be very slow to interfere with rational decisions 
taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities who have 
the responsibility to deal with such matters.124 
 
The State is required at times to adopt a holistic view taking into account the 
larger needs of society, as it is required to manage its limited resources in 
order to address all the existing basic needs rather than to focus on the needs 
of certain individuals.125  
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Consequently, the Court decided that the failure on the part of the state to 
provide renal dialysis to persons suffering from chronic renal failure did not 
constitute a breach of the state’s obligation in terms of section 27 of the 
Constitution.  
6.1.2 Government of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
Mrs. Grootboom, her two children and her sister who had three own 
children, all lived in a shack in an area near Cape Town. The area was 
water-logged and she and her family decided that they could not bear 
another season in the shack. Altogether, some 5,000 individuals lived in 
similar circumstances basically without electricity and without clean water, 
sewage or waste removal services. A large number of these individuals had 
previously applied with the municipality for subsidised low-cost housing, 
but despite having been included on a waiting list for many years, no other 
action had been taken on the part of the authorities.  
 
Instead, Mrs. Grootboom and some 1,000 adults and children chose to move 
to a vacant hillside in the vicinity that had already been designated for low-
cost housing. There they built makeshift houses by their own means.  
 
However, negotiations with the land-owner and the local council was to no 
avail and eventually a court order was issued declaring that the occupation 
of the land was inadmissible and that the occupants should be evicted.  
 
Subsequently the occupants were forcibly removed from the area and their 
makeshift houses were bulldozed. The group, now desperate and homeless, 
moved on to a local sports field. As the harsh winter rains of the Cape 
Province were approaching and the group only had minimal shelter living in 
what can only be described as intolerable conditions, they approached a 
local attorney who wrote to the council and demanded that the council meets 
its constitutional obligations by providing the group with temporary 
accommodation. Yet, the municipality’s response was in the negative and 
instead the group launched an urgent application to the High Court.126  
 
The question that was presented before the Court was whether economic 
and social rights could be regarded as flowing directly from the Constitution 
and be enforceable directly by the courts and how this would come about in 
practice? The case concerned the state’s obligations under section 26 of the 
Constitution which deals with the right to adequate housing and section 
28(1)(c) which gives children the right to shelter.127  
 
Section 26 of the South African Constitution provides that  
 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
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(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of this right.  
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions.  
 
In order to not be compelled to decide on the case under pressure caused by 
the expected heavy rains, the High Court ordered that, as an interim 
measure, the municipality should provide temporary shelter to the applicants 
pending the final decision.   
 
The state acknowledged at the hearings that the applicants were living under 
dire circumstances, but that it was a consequence of past injustices in form 
of Apartheid and not because of the state’s failure to respect current 
constitutional obligations. Instead, the state stressed the fact that it had 
implemented a large housing programme which gave millions of poor 
people without secure tenure the chance to move from makeshift shacks to 
proper housing with full title. According to the state, 750,000 families had 
already moved into subsidised housing of adequate standard and many more 
would benefit from the programme in the future.128  
 
In its decision the High Court concurred with the state that the latter had met 
its obligation to progressively realise the right of access to adequate housing 
in accordance with section 26(2) of the Constitution. However, the court 
decided that the state had not fulfilled its obligations in accordance with 
Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution, i.e.  
 
Every child has the right…  …to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services and social services.  
 
In this respect, the High Court highlighted that a child’s right to shelter was 
not qualified and there was no reference to progressive realisation within 
available resources. On the one hand, the shelter did not have to be of 
adequate standard, but on the other hand, the state had an obligation to 
provide children with some kind of shelter from the elements. In addition, 
since the children in question could not be separated from their parents, as a 
consequence, all people concerned should be given at least some basic 
protection.129  
 
The state appealed the case to the Constitutional Court.  
 
In arriving at his decision, judge Yacoob (all the other justices concurred in 
his judgement) undertook an analysis of the right to adequate housing in 
section 26(1).  
 
                                                 
128 Ibid.. 
129 Para. 12. 
 43
In the case it had been argued that the Court should seek guidance from the 
interpretations given to the economic and social rights under the ICESCR 
and the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. In its General Comment 3 the Committee has asserted that 
economic and social rights include a minimum core obligation that state 
parties need to fulfil. Otherwise, the state’s failure constitutes a prima facie 
failure to fulfil its obligations under the ICESCR.  
 
Justice Yacoob did not completely reject the minimum core approach130, but 
he concluded that “it is not necessary to decide whether it is appropriate for 
a court to determine in the first instance the minimum core of a right”.131  
 
In contrast, he held that the real issue is whether in terms of the South 
African Constitution, the measures adopted by the government to realise the 
right to adequate housing are reasonable.132 Reasonable measures would 
entail establishment and implementation of well-coordinated and coherent 
comprehensive programmes geared towards the progressive realisation of 
the right to access to adequate housing.  
 
Yacoob stressed that a court does not have to investigate whether there are 
more desirable or favourable measures that could have been adopted as it is 
necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures are always 
available for the state when trying to meet its obligations. However, in order 
to comply with its obligations, it is not enough to simply adopt legislation. 
The state is also compelled to act with a view to achieve the intended 
objectives of the legislation. In order to be reasonable, a program must also 
be balanced and flexible. In the context of access to adequate housing this 
would necessitate that the program makes appropriate provision for 
attention to housing crises and to short, medium and long term needs. 
According to Yacoob, a programme that excludes a significant segment of 
society cannot be deemed to be reasonable.133  
 
In the Grootboom case the programme adopted by the state was not 
reasonable. Although the state had put in place an integrated housing 
development policy whose medium and long term objectives could not be 
criticised, it was deemed to be void of any component that provided for 
those in desperate need. 
 
Consequently, Yacoob, in his decision, ruled that absence of such a 
component was unreasonable. In conclusion, the nationwide housing 
programme was insufficient as it failed to provide relief for those most 
desperately in need.134 
 
                                                 
130 Bilchitz, p. 140 -  Yacoob thus leaves room for its adoption in the future. 
131 Grootboom, para 33. 
132 Ibid.. Para. 41. 
133 Ibid.. Para. 43. 
134 Ibid.. Para. 66. 
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In its unanimous decisions the Court emphasised that the judgement should 
not be interpreted as approving any conduct aiming at invading land for the 
purpose of forcing the state to provide housing on a preferential basis to 
people who participated in any such exercise.  
 
The Court issued a declaratory order that made it incumbent on states to 
devise and implement a programme that contained initiatives aiming at 
providing relief for those most desperate in need and who had not earlier 
been catered for in the existing programmes.  
6.1.3 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment 
Action Campaign and Others (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 
721 (CC) 
In this case the Constitutional Court addressed the issue of the government’s 
prohibition to provide the drug, Nevirapine, in the public health system, 
save for provision to a very limited number of test sites.  
 
The drug, that was available in the private health sector, prevents mother to 
child transmission of the HIV virus and it had been determined to be safe 
and effective. Moreover, the reason for not providing the drug was not 
contingent on the availability of resources as South Africa would receive 
free supplies of the drug for a minimum of five years.  
 
However, the government’s stance was that although the procurement of the 
drug did not incur any costs, the implementation of providing the drug to the 
public would require counselling and other support services. Services that 
cost money.  
 
The complainants, the Treatment and Action Campaign and Others, argued 
that notwithstanding the fact the provision of the drug under ideal 
circumstances would require support services, the drug in itself was still life 
saving. As a consequence, it would be illogical to preclude its use.  
 
The complaints argued that it should be left to the discretion of the involved 
physicians working in the public sector whether the patient’s circumstances 
merited the use of the drug.  
  
According to Section 27(1) of the Constitution.  
 
Everyone has the right to have access to… health care services, including 
reproductive health care; and… the state must take reasonable steps 
legislative and other measures within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right.  
 
The government argued before the Constitutional Court that courts in South 
Africa are constrained by the doctrine of separation of powers from issuing 
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anything else than a declaratory order in economic and social rights 
cases.135  
 
This argument was rejected by the Court which reiterated that the separation 
 not 
 
The primary duty of Courts is to the Constitution and the law, which they 
as 
y 
ers 
 or 
uch 
o 
onsequently, the Court rejected the argument that the only power it was 
 
 
rt, 
ces 
onetheless, caution must be exercised to the roles of the legislature and 
hat have 
ence, the Court was compelled to elaborate on its constitutional role as to 
the protection of economic and social rights and interpreted that the 
                                                
of powers intrinsic in the 1996 Constitution can not be considered as 
absolute. The different branches of government have an obligation to 
respect the boundaries of their respective domains. However, this does
imply that courts are prevented from making orders that have an impact on 
policy.136 In the contrary, the Constitution has places an obligation on courts
to do so.  
 
“
must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.” Where State 
policy is challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, Courts have to 
consider whether in formulating and implementing such policy the State h
given effect to its constitutional obligations. If it should hold in any given 
case that the State has failed to do so, it is obliged by the Constitution to sa
so. Insofar, as this constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the Executive, 
that is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself. There is also no 
merit in the argument advanced on behalf of the Government that a 
distinction should be drawn between declaratory and mandatory ord
against government. Even simple declaratory orders against government
organs of State can affect their policy and may well have budgetary 
implications. Government is constitutionally bound to give effect to s
orders whether or not they affect its policy and has to find the resources t
do so”.137   
 
C
endowed with in the actual case was to issues a declaratory order. In cases
where a breach of a right, including economic and social rights, has taken 
place the court is obliged to make sure that effective relief is given. The 
court will be guided by the nature of the transgression what concerns the
pertinent relief in a particular case.138 According to the Constitutional Cou
South African courts have a wide range of powers to safeguard that the 
principles of the Constitution are respected. It depends on the circumstan
of a particular case how those powers are discharged. 
 
N
executive in a democratic society. It is clear, however, that when 
appropriate, courts must use their wide discretion to make orders t
consequences on legislation and policy.139 
 
H
 
135 TAC para 96-97 
136 Ibid.. Para., 98. 
137 Ibid.. Para 99. 
138 Ibid.. Para 116. 
139 Ibid.. Para., 113. 
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Constitution requires it to adopt a restrained and focused role, i.e. to require 
that the state takes measures to meet its constitutional obligations and
the reasonableness of these measures through judicial evaluation. Although 
the outcome of such an evaluation may have budgetary implications, they 
are not in themselves geared towards changing the budget. By adopting this 
position, the Court would ensure that the constitutional balance between th
judiciary, the legislator and the executive is adhered to.  
 
With regard to how the “reasonableness “standard of ado
 to test 
e 
pted measures 
hould be interpreted in the context of progressively implementing 
ccount the degree and 
xtent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those, whose 
 
not 
 that as far as socio-economic rights are 
oncerned, the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures. It 
to 
are 
at the state has at least a 
egative obligation to refrain from preventing or impairing the right.143  
t 
evirapine was safe and would undoubtedly save a significant number of 
l.  
andled by the Constitutional Court, there had been positive changes with 
as 
                                                
s
economic and social rights, the Court stated that: 
 
“To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of a
e
needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is
most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving 
realisation of the right”.140 “A programme for the realisation of socio-
economic rights must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate 
provision for attention to… crises and to short, medium and long term 
needs. A programme that excludes a significant segment of society can
be said to be reasonable”.141   
 
Furthermore, the Court stressed
c
is not sufficient to only take legislative measures and they are not likely 
by themselves constitute constitutional compliance. Instead, appropriate 
policies and program implementation by the executive must support the 
legislative measures. It is imperative that these policies and programmes 
reasonable both as to implementation and conception. A program that is 
reasonable but which is not implemented reasonably will not be sufficient to 
meet the state’s constitutional obligations.142  
 
In addition, in the case, the Court also noted th
n
 
By adopting these standards, the Court decided that owing to the fact tha
N
lives even when prescribed under non-ideal conditions, the prohibition of 
the use of medications was unreasonable and consequently unconstitutiona
 
It should be noted that when the case reached the appeal stage, and was 
h
regard to the national programme to prevent HIV transmission, which w
now better developed and more advanced. However, still the state had to 
avail, if necessary, pertinent training for the counsellors based on public 
 
140 Ibid..  
141 Ibid.. 
142 Ibid.. 
143 Ibid.. 
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hospitals and clinics, on the use of Nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother
to-child transmission of HIV and take other related reasonable measures t
the extent that clinics and hospitals throughout the public sector would be 
able to facilitate and expedite the use of Nevirapine. 
 
In conclusion, the Court stated that the orders made d
-
o 
id not preclude the 
tate from adopting policies in a manner consistent with the Constitution if 
ld 
velopment, the question was whether a 
certain provision in the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 was 
ng 
ica as 
ermanent residents. In the interest of the general public, included in their 
 who 
 
before the High Court that their constitutional rights 
 equality, social rights and the rights of their children had been violated 
 
truck down on a 
umber of challenged provisions in the Act relating to old-age grants, child-
lf the 
 Development appealed the decision and the majority 
f the Constitutional Court held that the South African Constitution endows 
                                                
s
improved methods became available to it for prevention of mother-to-chi
transmission of HIV.144 
6.1.4 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 
2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) 
In Khosa v. Minister of Social De
constitutionally invalid as it disqualified non-South African citizens residi
in South Africa from receiving certain welfare entitlements.  
 
The applicants were Mozambican citizens living in South Afr
p
case were other people belonging to the class of permanent residents
could not litigate personally. If the group would have had South African 
citizenships they would have been qualified for social welfare entitlements
under the mentioned Act. They were all destitute and would have been 
entitled to pension grants and other social assistance entitlements such as 
child-support grants.  
 
The applicants argued 
to
because of the citizenship requirement in the Social Assistance Act. They 
claimed that section 27 of the Constitution guaranteed the right to social 
security for everyone, including permanent residents. Hence the legislation
excluding the group should be rendered unconstitutional.  
 
Their application was unopposed in the High Court.  
 
The High Court ruled in favour of the applicants and s
n
support grants and care-dependency grants. Moreover, it ordered the 
authorities to pay to the applicants the grants in question and certain 
outstanding payments. It also instructed the authorities to receive and 
process applications for grants from the other persons on whose beha
applicants had acted.  
 
The Minister of Social
o
 
144 Ibid.. 
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the right to social security to everyone including non-citizens who are 
permanent residents.  
 
The Court reasoned that certain rights in the Constitution such as political 
ghts (section 19) and the right to have access to land (section 25(5)) have 
h 
anent 
sidents from access to social assistance grants was reasonable.  
and what 
pact the exclusion has on the situation of permanent residents and how 
luding the right to 
ocial security was that “as a society we value human beings and want to 
ed 
that 
ent residents in the 
cheme would not incur an excessive burden on the state.149 However, the 
ed 
re grave. They are relegated to the margins of society and are deprived of 
ns, the Court reached the conclusion that the 
xclusion of permanent residents was inconsistent with section 27 of the 
pinion, Judge Ngcobo with judge Madala concurring found 
at limitations on the access to the right to social security in the Act were 
reasonable as the state has insufficient resources to provide for everyone and 
                                                
ri
been explicitly limited to citizens. However, section 27 did not contain suc
a limitation. Judge Mokgoro, writing for the majority, held that the word 
“everyone” could not be interpreted as only referring to citizens.145 
 
The Court also investigated the issued whether the exclusion of perm
re
 
Here the Court elaborated on what purpose social security served 
im
relevant it was to apply a citizenship requirement.146   
 
The Court concluded that the underlying reason for inc
s
ensure that people are afforded their basis needs”.147 Such a reason includ
the needs of non-citizens and there were no valid reasons for making a 
distinction between citizens and permanent residents in this regard. As 
permanent residents have the same obligations as citizens, it is illogical 
they do not also have the same rights as citizens.148  
 
The Court also concluded that an inclusion of perman
s
exclusion of permanent residents had considerable impact on those exclud
as it forced them into a situation where they were dependant on their 
families, relatives and communities.  
 
For them “the denial of the right is total and the consequences of the denial 
a
what may be essential to enable them to enjoy other rights vested in them 
under the Constitution”.150 
 
Based on these consideratio
e
Constitution.151 
 
In a dissenting o
th
 
145 Khosa, para 47. 
146 Ibid., para 49.  
147 Ibid., para. 52. 
148 Ibid., para 59. 
149 Ibid., para 60-62. 
150 Ibid., para 77. 
151 Ibid., para 85. 
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was entitled to give priority to its own citizens. They added that it was 
important that the provision of benefits would not create a pull-factor 
resulting in incentives to migrate to South Africa. Furthermore, the Act had 
the legitimate aim of encouraging self-sufficiency among immigrants. T
dissenting minority also stressed that the limitation on eligibility for so
security was only temporary owing to the fact that it was possible for a 
permanent resident to be naturalised and become a citizen after five 
years.
he 
cial 
                                                
152  
 
152 Ibid., para 113. 
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7 Analyses 
7.1 Introduction 
On the one hand, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on socio-
economic rights has attracted much criticism from some academic and 
social activists. Their main argument has been that the Court has not gone 
far enough in protecting economic and social rights and has hence not 
adhered to its constitutional mandate.153 They argue that the Court has been 
too complaisant to government and that its interpretative strategies give too 
much room and discretion to government when it comes to implementing 
economic and social rights.  
 
Moreover, the Court has in particular been criticised for not sufficiently 
focusing on remedies. Mr. Soobramoney passed away shortly after his 
request was rejected by the Constitutional Court and some critics claimed 
that the Court’s approach was utilitarian, which is problematic from a rights 
perspective as it is premised on a hypothesis of fixed and limited resources. 
Naturally, the Court also attracted criticism as it was asserted that by not 
offering relief in a case as extreme as that pertaining Mr. Soobramoney, the 
Court was refusing to exercise its duty to implement the economic and 
social rights provisions of the Constitution.154 
 
However, there have also been complaints that the Constitutional Court has 
gone too far and that it has threaded into areas that are the prerogatives of 
the legislature and executive and that its decisions in particularly 
Grootboom, TAC and Khosa have had negative consequences in terms of 
increases in the nation’s public expenditure.  
 
Others claim that the Court has successfully negotiated its review function 
with regard to socio-economic rights and that it has actively sought 
possibilities to expose political resource allocation to constitutional 
standards.155 
 
The various comments, to a high extent, resemble various arguments that 
were presented already during the drafting of the Constitution. Clearly, a lot 
of people arguing for an inclusion had high hopes that the inclusion would 
give immediate and noticeable  results in terms of changing the situation of 
those most desperately in need – that if the Constitution would have any 
legitimacy, it would deal with the fundamental needs of the people. 
Moreover, on the other side, commentators criticise the Court for having 
gone too far and for, in its judgements, having entered into the domains of 
the executive and the legislature. 
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7.2 How has the Court in its judgements 
defined the character of the applicable 
socio-economic rights? 
In general, and particularly in TAC and Grootboom, the Court has held the 
view that despite the fact that the obligations placed on the state are subject 
to the availability of resources, the state must create broad policies and 
inclusive programs that pay particular attention to those who are most in 
need. The state must demonstrate that it tries to implement these programs, 
i.e. take “all reasonable steps necessary to initiate and sustain” such 
programs.156 
 
The approach in Grootboom built on the premise that the government 
programme in regard to housing had to be reasonable to pass the 
constitutional test. Owing to the fact that the programme failed to provide 
for those in most desperate need in the short term, the programme was 
deemed to be unreasonable and hence unconstitutional.  
 
Despite the fact that reasonableness appears in a number of aspects of law, it 
is an elusive concept that is not always very well defined.157  
 
Sunstein has referred to the approach adopted in the Grootboom case as 
being an “administrative law model of socio-economic rights”.158 
Administrative review is similar to constitutional review as the judiciary 
deals with reviews of decisions taken by another branch of government.  
 
Bilchitz has made an attempt to summarise what the reasonableness test in 
administrative law generally implies and concludes that most commentators 
agree that the notion of reasonableness is created to refer to that what lies 
between the limits of reason and what allows for a legitimate diversity of 
views.159 Reasonableness is not synonymous with what is “correct”, but 
includes situations which lie between “correctness” and “inconsistency”.160 
A decision is reasonable if it is supported by evidence and reasons that are 
logically connected to a purpose.  
 
Justice Albie Sachs who was one of the with the majority concurring judges 
in the cases of Soobramoney,  Grootboom and TAC. He has explained the 
reasoning behind the “reasonableness concept” as follows. All the economic 
and social rights cases discussed have by their very nature entailed 
discussions on “rationing”.  
 
                                                 
156 Grootboom, para 67. 
157 Bilchitz, p. 142. 
158 Sunstein, C., p. 23. 
159 Bilchitz, pp. 142-144. 
160 Ibid. p. 142. 
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Rationing should not be understood as a restriction of or limitation of a right 
such as the right to health care, but “the very condition for its proper 
exercise”.161 In this respect economic and social rights are different as to 
“their mode of enjoyment, if not in their essence, from civil and political 
rights”.162  
 
On the one hand, the right to free speech is not, by its very nature, rationed 
as anybody can whenever that persons wants say what he or she wants. The 
right is fully-fledged from the start and not subject to any progressive 
realisation. On the other hand, as economic and social rights are realised 
within available resources and progressive realisation, “a system of 
apportionment is fundamental to their very being”.163  
 
This would indicate that the Court’s jurisprudence imply that economic and 
social rights do have different characteristics from classical individual civil 
right as the latter are autonomous and complete by themselves, whereas 
economic and social rights are shared often under circumstances of 
competition for limited resources.164 In this respect the right to treatment 
cannot be equated with the right to vote.  
 
Obviously, this does not justify the conclusion that the right to health care is 
subordinate to the right of vote or of lower quality. However, there is a 
difference in the mode of protection of these rights as illustrated by the four 
judgements.165  
 
In the Grootboom case the Court was expressly asked to adopt a minimum 
core approach as outlined by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, but it declined to do so. Moreover, it has not explicitly 
applied such an approach in the other cases.  
 
According to Albie Sachs, the South African Constitution is expressive 
enough to provide basic guidance on how the government’s obligations 
should be interpreted which renders a minimum core approach superfluous. 
Moreover, the judges had great difficulties in establishing clear evidence on 
how the minimum core could be identified other than “by reference to 
people dropping below the level that basic requirements of human dignity 
necessitated.”166 Thus, it seems that the Court has domestically encountered 
the same problem as has the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights on the international level, i.e. to establish the minimum core content 
or standards of socio-economic rights. 
 
Instead, the Court unanimously held that the Constitution provided an 
obligation on the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures and 
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that the concept of “reasonable measures” was one that could be adjudicated 
on by the Court. In the case the government measures failed to meet the 
standard of reasonableness, the state would have failed to meet its 
constitutional obligations. Such a determination by the Court had to take 
into account the special expertise of the government in the area of housing 
and that a large number of policy alternatives would be consistent with the 
reasonableness standard.167  
 
In the Grootboom case the Court found that although the government’s 
housing program was impressive, it was void of provision for persons most 
desperately in need. These people were subjected to such conditions and 
crisis that their dignity was seriously disturbed. Although the program was 
reasonable in a broad sense, it had a serious gap which prevented it from 
being in conformity with the constitutional requirement of being reasonable.  
 
In its jurisprudence, the Court has been strongly influenced by the way in 
which the various rights of the Bill of Rights are interrelated and 
interdependent as for instance the right of housing can not be seen isolated 
from the right to human dignity.  
 
A more quantitative approach such as the minimum core approach could 
have implied in the case of Grootboom that the state would have met its 
obligations by international standards as it had obviously adopted an 
extensive policy on provision for formal housing. However, the qualitative 
element of economic and social rights would not have been identified. 
Instead the Court stressed that, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, it must 
promote the values of human dignity, equality and freedom.168 
Consequently, these values guided the Court when identifying the 
Government’s obligations with regard to the right to adequate access to 
housing and what could be regarded as reasonable.     
 
In the TAC case, the Court did not reject the minimum core approach as 
such. However, it concluded that the minimum core obligation could be met 
through broad governmental programmes that tried to meet the minimum 
needs.  
 
When compared with the three other cases, it is obvious that the reasoning 
and application of the reasonableness approach in Khosa is different. In the 
other three cases, the reasonableness approach had been applied to the 
question of the normative content of the socio-economic right in question. 
However, in Khosa the approach was applied to the question who is the 
beneficiary of such rights.169 In this perspective, the fundamental question 
in Khosa could also have been interpreted as an equality issue in accordance 
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with section 9 of the Constitution, i.e. a group could be identified who were 
excluded from the scheme.170  
 
In the Grootboom and TAC cases it was concluded that the subjects of the 
rights were entitled to reasonable government action to realise their socio-
economic rights, whereas in Khosa the question was who are the 
beneficiaries of the reasonable government action? This is confusing as that 
would imply that the reasonableness approach applies to both questions of 
scope and content.  
 
The Courts reasonableness approach has been criticized on several grounds 
by David Bilchitz. He claims that it lacks the content necessary to make 
determinations on socio-economic rights and hence results in decisions that 
are not adequately justified. Moreover, there is a risk that the approach 
deflects the constitutional enquiry from concentrating on the rights at stake 
and instead results in a general balancing of various considerations.171  
 
These are valid arguments as the process becomes very obscure and some of 
the judgements, like in Khosa tend to be mere stipulations. Thus, when 
discussing the contours and content of the socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution, the judgements have provided very little guidance to the other 
branches of government regarding their obligations with regard to the 
realisation of socio-economic rights.  
7.3 How has the Court delineated its 
institutional role in the context of the 
separation powers doctrine and how has it 
approached the issue of polycentric 
issues? 
In the Treatment Action Campaign case the Court argued on appeal to the 
Constitutional Court that the separation of powers doctrine constrained the 
Court from issuing anything but a declaratory order in economic and social 
rights cases.172 Hence, the High Court had gone too far when it ordered a 
specific government response to what it perceived was unconstitutional 
practice on the part of the government. However, the Constitutional Court 
stated that 
 
“The question in the present case … is not whether socio-economic rights 
are justiciable. Clearly they are”.173 
 
Hence, the Court strongly stressed that economic and social rights are 
justiciable and rejected the government’s arguments.  
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According to the Court the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution 
are not absolute. While the branches of government shall respect the 
respective areas of other branches, this do not imply that courts are 
prevented from making orders that impact on policy.174 In the contrary, the 
Constitution places an obligation on the courts to do so.  
 
Moreover, in the case the court identified its primary duty as being to the 
Constitution and the law. The law should be applied in an impartial manner 
and without fear, favour of prejudice.175  
 
“Where a state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, 
Courts have to consider whether in formulating and implementing such 
policy the State has given effect to its constitutional obligations. If it should 
hold in any given case that the State has failed to do so, it is obliged by the 
Constitution to say so. Insofar as this constitutes an intrusion into the 
domain of the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution 
itself. There is also no merit in the argument advanced on behalf of the 
government that a distinction should be drawn between the declaratory and 
mandatory orders against government. Even simple declaratory orders 
against government or organs of State can affect their policy and may well 
have budgetary implications. Government is constitutionally bound to give 
effect to such orders whether or not they affect its policy and has to find the 
resources to do so”.176   
 
The Court rejected the argument that it would only be endowed with powers 
to issue declaratory orders. It has stressed that when a violation of a right 
has occurred, including economic and social rights, the Court is bound by a 
duty to safeguard that an effective remedy is provided. In these cases the 
Court will be guided by the nature of the infringement and the nature of the 
right violated, when deciding on the appropriate relief in a particular case.177  
 
According to the Court it has a wide range of powers at its disposal to 
safeguard that the Constitution is protected. How this is done in practice 
depends on the particularities of the case.178  
 
“Here due regard must be paid to the roles of the Legislature and the 
Executive in a democracy. What must be made clear, however, is that when 
it is appropriate to do so, Courts may – and if need be, must, use their wide 
powers to make orders that affect policy as well as legislation”.179 
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According to Marius Pieterse this indicates that the only restrictions 
envisaged by the Court on judicial powers are those which it deems 
appropriate considering the circumstances in a particular case.180  
 
In addition, the Court seems to place much emphasis on Court orders being 
phrased in a fashion that does not reduce the flexibility of the policy to such 
an extent that the executive is hindered from exercising its legitimate 
powers to change or adapt the policy if the need arises.181 
 
It is interesting to note that the Court has interpreted the Constitution as it is 
obliged, not only allowed to decide on the validity of policy and legislation 
concerning economic and social rights. However, at the same time, in its 
jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court has also adopted a position where it 
shows some deference to the other branches of government and especially 
with regard to decisions on economic and social rights compared with civil 
and political rights.182  
 
In all the four cases, the Court has in its decisions focused on the state’s 
programs and policies instead of on the individual’s call for relief.183 This 
approach can partly be explained by inherent practical problems in regard to 
adjudication of economic and social rights cases in general, i.e. the 
procedural limitation in terms of concerns about the suitability of any 
particular plaintiff and hence the problem with regard to identifying 
appropriate remedies.184 However, it is also obvious that the Court has 
adopted an approach where it shows great sensitivity for legitimacy 
concerns and the fact that remedies could be politically inappropriate.  
 
“If unremediable, this failure of socioeconomic rights would mean that our 
reliance on rights as tools for social change is misplaced and that we should 
instead create and pursue other avenues towards socioeconomic 
upliftment”.185  
 
The Court has recognised the information problem inherent in decisions 
pertaining polycentric issues and has in all the cases regularly requested 
additional information before and after hearing the oral arguments of the 
parties. In addition, it has been hesitant to decide on issues where it lacks 
adequate data. This has resulted in a quite narrow interpretation of its 
substantive decision-making area and the Court has only made decisions in 
very precise areas where it has determined that it has sufficient information 
to adjudicate.186 Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court has 
expressed that the biggest problem concerning judicial enforcement and 
adjudication of the economic and social rights cases has not been one of 
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 57
institutional legitimacy as the Constitution requires that the courts ensure 
the respect of such rights.187 According to him, the real problem has been 
with institutional capacity and that there is a risk that judges are likely “to 
get it all wrong” as there is little doubt that judges in general have limited 
knowledge of the practicalities of housing, land and other social realities.188 
Owing to this, it can be inappropriate to pronounce on such issues. Instead, 
the parliament, which can arrange hearings and receive inputs from a variety 
of sources and experts in different areas is much more suitable to adopt such 
a role.189  
 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the very nature of political 
processes is one of compromises and balancing of interests. It is a matter of 
give-and-take rather than of all-or-nothing. Yet, Albie Sachs warns that 
compromises on matters of deep principle are dangerous. Here he draws a 
distinction between the mobilisation of maximum support in political 
processes and the principled balancing in matters of fundamental rights 
which is central to the function of the judiciary.190 Although judges are 
institutionally inapt to decide on electricity, houses, hospitals and schools as 
they lack the know-how and capacity, they do have knowledge about 
“human dignity”. In Sach`s words this means that judges “know about 
oppression” and what “reduce a human being to a status below that which a 
democratic society would regard as tolerable”.191 
 
In general, and particularly in the Soobramoney, TAC and Grootboom cases, 
the Court has adopted the position that notwithstanding the fact that the 
obligations placed on the state are contingent on the availability of 
resources, the Court will require the establishment of broad policies and 
inclusive programs that pay special attention to those who are considered as 
the most vulnerable in society. This is in a way an acknowledgement of the 
fact that the Court is aware of its limitations in regard to ensuring the 
fulfilment of economic and social rights and that it can not act alone. The 
Court is only one of out of a total of three branches of government that 
cooperate in the process of achieving economic and social rights for large 
sections of the South African nation.  
 
However, the Constitutional Court has demonstrated that it is not powerless 
in the context of the separation of powers doctrine and that it is tasked with 
domestic enforcement of socio-economic rights, although it is aware that it 
needs to show hesitancy to alter and disturb processes related to policy and 
budget.  
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8 Conclusions 
When analysing the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on socio-economic 
rights from a more broad and general perspective, it is evident that its 
rulings have demonstrated that such rights are, in principle, constitutionally 
justiciable.  
 
In this context, it is important to remember that “justiciability” is not 
synonymous with “enforceability”. Obviously, there is a close relationship 
between the two, but enforceability of human rights is more linked to the 
identification of entitlements and duties created by the state which have to 
be maintained and executed, whereas justiciability requires that there is a 
review mechanism to assess non-compliance with the rights regime.  
 
In this respect the Court has demonstrated that it is equipped and capable of 
giving effect to socio-economic rights without necessarily violating the 
boundaries of the separation of powers doctrine.  It has successfully 
negotiated its review function in socio-economic cases and avoided open 
political confrontation. In general, its decisions are legal to their nature and 
one cannot accuse the Court for having resorted to politics.  
 
That said, the Court’s judgements have also highlighted that adjudication of 
constitutional socio-economic rights is complicated and that courts are in 
practice forced to treat such rights differently from civil and political rights.  
 
Despite the fact that members of the Court have expressed that problems 
related to institutional legitimacy have been of limited concern and although 
it has managed to subject issues of resource allocation to judicial scrutiny, it 
is evident from the judgements that this is an area where courts have to be 
more vary of the institutional dangers and potential legitimacy concerns 
associated with the separation of powers doctrine. 
 
This has a tendency to result in situations where the Court has to more often 
adopt a position of deference. Or in other words, it has to frame its decisions 
in a manner that avoids major confrontation with the other branches of 
government. This affects the content of its judgements in socio-economic 
rights cases. The reason is that courts seem to inevitable encounter various 
capacity problems when adjudicating socio-economic rights as they tend to 
work under circumstances of insufficient information and inadequate 
understanding of the polycentric issues involved.  
 
Judges are afraid of getting it all wrong and in South Africa the 
Constitutional Court has adopted an approach where it shows great 
sensitivity for legitimacy concerns and the fact that remedies could be 
politically inappropriate.  
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The problems associated with lack of adequate data or the full picture have 
resulted in a narrow interpretation of its substantive decision-making area 
and the Court has therefore only made decisions in very precise areas where 
it has determined that it has sufficient information to adjudicate. Moreover, 
contrary to what applies in regard to most adjudication of civil and political 
rights, there tend to be procedural concerns in relation to the suitability of 
any particular plaintiff. Overall, this has a tendency to limit the scope of a 
court’s judgements in socio-economic rights cases and particularly with 
regard to a court’s willingness to decide on remedies with regard to 
violations of such rights. 
 
From a rights perspective this could be discomforting. As mentioned in 
chapter 3.2.6, states do have an obligation to respect, protect and to fulfil the 
human rights of individuals. Or in other words, rights are concerned with 
individuals and their situation. Consequently, in theory, litigation on socio-
economic rights should be concerned to remedy injustices faced by 
individuals. Socio-economic rights would only be useful to rights-bearers 
when the rights in question have the likelihood to bring about a positive 
change in people’s lives. In this context, individual rights-bearers should be 
able to rely on socio-economic rights and the legal process for the 
alleviation of their socio-economic immediate needs. However, if such a 
legal process is unable to bring about such a positive change for the 
individual, the individual has very few incentives to initiate such legal 
proceedings in the first place. Thus undermining the whole idea of a rights-
based discourse in the context of socio-economic rights.  
 
One could argue that the Constitutional Court has found that socio-
economic rights are not separately enforceable rights relating to certain 
socio-economic needs, but rather general guarantees that a state’s socio-
economic policies may be reviewed against certain benchmarks or relational 
standards which show if the state has performed in conformity with 
principles of good governance. This would mean that socio-economic rights 
would only serve the purpose of assuring that the government is doing its 
best in trying to alleviate problems such as poverty and other socio-
economic hardships.  
 
In all cases the Court has in principle dismissed the minimum-core 
approach. Furthermore, its jurisprudence has not been particularly content-
driven and it has had problems identifying the content of socio-economic 
rights.  
 
This could support the view that socio-economic rights such as the rights to 
adequate housing and health care are inherently vague and lack concrete 
content with regard to entitlements to the individual. This means that the 
Court has not been able to overcome the problem of absence of an exact 
standard that indicates what constitutes the minimum norm of observance of 
a socio-economic right in an individual case.  
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That said, however, it has indicated in both Grootboom and TAC that some 
levels of enjoyment are more essential than others pointing in the direction 
that there are thresholds, especially when looking at the total or part of a 
population, which could be identified through the reasonableness-approach.  
In Grootboom the programme adopted was deemed unreasonable as it did 
not provide for those “most desperately in need”. 
 
However, when adjudicating alleged violations of rights, it is a question of a 
particular type of failure that we are concerned with. Namely, it is about 
addressing certain vital interests that people have. One of the major 
theoretical weaknesses of the reasonableness approach is that it fails to 
focus on the fundamental interests of individuals at the very centre of its 
enquiry into such cases.192  
 
Within the context of the notion of indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of all human rights, it is difficult to find good reasons for 
including socio-economic rights in a constitution if it is not envisioned, like 
in the case of civil and political rights, that they are designed to protect the 
fundamental interests of individuals in having access to essentials such as 
food, housing and health care.  
 
An objection to this critic against the reasonableness approach could be that 
it might be wise and more sustainable to adopt a phased jurisprudence on 
the protection of socio-economic rights. It would be possible to build on the 
findings of the analysed cases in the future and determine guidelines as to 
decision-making on reasonableness. A contrary approach would by 
necessity require that the Court would assign a very detailed and specific 
content to each of the socio-economic rights in the Constitution. This is not 
only difficult, but also sensitive as it would run the risk of rigidifying the 
law too swiftly. By adopting an approach where the Court, limits its 
decisions to narrow limited areas of a particular case, it manages to avoid 
making too general pronouncements that could in the future lead to 
wrongful decisions in different situations and circumstances.  
 
It seems that the above would support the argument by commentators such 
as Sean Archer that there are greater margins of error attached to socio-
economic rights than civil and political rights.193  
 
Nevertheless, what is certain is that the Court has in all cases confirmed 
that, like civil and political rights, economic and social rights in the 
Constitution are justiciable. This is most clearly stated in TAC as the Court 
dismissed the government’s argument that Courts were not empowered to 
make other decisions than declarations on human rights in polycentric 
socio-economic rights cases.  
 
Read together the four decisions clearly show that socio-economic rights are 
in principle equally suitable for judicial vindication as their civil and 
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political counterparts. However as resources are always limited, there 
enjoyment are always subject to some form of rationing, which has an 
impact on courts’ possibilities to provide relief for a particular individual. 
As mentioned, the Court has, in all cases, been reluctant to provide relief to 
individuals and instead focused on the reasonableness of government 
policies. Consequently, this would indicate that socio-economic rights are 
different in regard to their mode of enjoyment, perhaps in their essence, 
when compared with civil and political rights.  
 
In this respect, one adverse consequence of the approach adopted by the 
South African Constitutional Court, could be that the Court’s 
inability/unwillingness to offer individual relief undermines the role of 
litigation in terms of generally protecting individuals by ensuring good 
governance as individuals’ willingness to bring cases grounded in socio-
economic claims to the Court would be reduced. Most likely, deserving 
individuals have few incentives to initiate constitutional cases for the sole 
reason of changing general government policies as their immediate concern 
is to see some positive action taken to improve their own individual 
situation. This stresses the importance of the existence and mobilization of 
interest groups, such as in the cases of Khosa and TAC, who could initiate 
socio-economic rights cases before the courts Cases that could eventually 
improve the enjoyment of socio-economic rights of individuals through 
improved government polices.  
 
However, if, in practice, the adjudication of socio-economic rights is 
contingent on the existence of such groups, that would in a way run contrary 
to the endeavours to protect those who are most marginalised and vulnerable 
as there are no guarantees that their specific needs are the most 
“fashionable” to be supported or likely to be identified and heard by groups 
that have the capacity and interest to bring cases to the courts.  
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